Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and the Pursuit of Equality and Liberty by Roy, Deborah A.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2013
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and
the Pursuit of Equality and Liberty
Deborah A. Roy
Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Biography Commons, and the Legal History
Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and the Pursuit of Equality and Liberty, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 665 (2013)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss3/6
 
665 
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., JAMES 
WILSON, AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY AND 
LIBERTY 
DEBORAH A. ROY* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of one of the most transformative 
Supreme Court Justices, William J. Brennan, Jr., from the perspective of 
his vision that the United States Constitution is founded on Human 
Dignity. Justice Brennan expressed this principle in his opinions that 
advanced the realization of individual rights for each and every American. 
The principle of human dignity invokes the values of equality and liberty. 
The article shows that Justice Brennan traced the principle of human 
dignity back to the Founding Fathers and the constitutional government 
that they established. Rather than being unhinged from the Constitution as 
his critics allege, Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence is firmly grounded in 
the Constitution. The Article demonstrates this by examining the 
constitutional principles held by James Wilson who signed both the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. This Article analyzes 
Justice Brennan’s leading decisions in the areas of criminal procedure, 
equal protection, freedom of speech, and a right to privacy as expressions 
of the values of equality and liberty. The Article concludes with a 
consideration of how a Constitution based on human dignity informs 
contemporary issues including Same-Sex Marriage, Affirmative Action, 
and Campaign Finance Regulation. Justice Brennan’s advancement of 
human dignity through the law is a remarkable achievement that should 
remain relevant to current American jurisprudence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,1 is one of the most transformative justices to sit 
on the United States Supreme Court.2 His opinions upholding the values of equality 
                                                           
 1 William Joseph Brennan, Jr. served as an Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court for 34 years. During his lengthy tenure he authored 1,573 opinions: 533 
opinions for the Court, 694 dissents, and 346 concurrences. Justice Brennan was born on April 
25, 1906 to parents who had emigrated from Ireland, the second of eight children. He received 
his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Finance 
and Commerce and his law degree from Harvard Law School. Justice Brennan practiced labor 
law at a firm in Newark, New Jersey, served in the United States Army during World War II, 
and became a judge in the New Jersey state courts, eventually joining the New Jersey 
Supreme Court. President Eisenhower appointed Justice Brennan to the Supreme Court in 
1956. Justice Brennan Memorials, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
justice-brennan-memorials (last visited Aug. 24, 2013). For a recent biography of Justice 
Brennan, see SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 
(2010). 
 2 Even those who disagree with Justice Brennan acknowledge his substantial influence on 
the Supreme Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, who often opposed Brennan, remarked that Justice 
Brennan “is probably the most influential justice of the century.” Patricia Brennan, Seven 
Justices, On Camera, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at Y06; see also Lino A. Graglia, The 
Legacy of Justice Brennan: Constitutionalization of the Left-Liberal Political Agenda, 77 
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and liberty, which derive from his belief that the principle of human dignity is firmly 
entrenched in the United States Constitution,3 secured individual rights for all 
Americans and advanced a nation.4 In his own retrospective of his years on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan stated, “[a]s I have said many times and in many 
ways, our Constitution is a charter of human rights and human dignity. It is a bold 
commitment by a people to the ideal of dignity protected through law.”5 Although he 
authored many seminal opinions, Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence is often 
overlooked and not considered to be relevant today. This article will show that 
Brennan’s vision of the Constitution is timeless and that it is firmly grounded in 
constitutional principles held by one of the most significant Framers, James Wilson 
of Pennsylvania, who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the United 
States Constitution. 6 
Justice Brennan’s constitutional jurisprudence focused on achieving the full 
realization of individual rights, based in equality and liberty that were recognized in 
the Declaration of Independence, protected in the United States Constitution with its 
                                                           
WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 183-84 (1999) (Although critical of Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence, the 
author recognizes that “[t]he changes brought about by the Supreme Court during Justice 
Brennan’s tenure were truly revolutionary, remaking not only our form of government, but 
also the nature of our society and the quality of civilization.”). 
 3 Authors who have reviewed the many references to “human dignity” found in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence identify Justice Brennan as a leading proponent of the concept. See 
DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 166-67 (1997) (describing Justice Brennan’s effort to 
advance the dignity of all persons as “one of the remarkable events in American constitutional 
history,” although questioning whether his objective was achieved); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, 
BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 40-42 (1999) (stating that human dignity is at the core of Justice 
Brennan’s jurisprudence); THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN 
VALUES 9 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (dedicating the volume to 
Justice Brennan “in recognition of his long and distinguished career and in acknowledgement 
of his tireless commitment to the defense of human dignity”); Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and 
Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223 
(1998) (tracing the history of human dignity in Supreme Court jurisprudence and exploring 
Justice Brennan’s vision of the role that human dignity should play in a constitutional system); 
Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 
NEB. L. REV. 740, 783 (2006) (finding Justice Brennan’s vision of human dignity expressed in 
numerous cases). 
 4 Justice Brennan viewed the protection of individual rights as the principal contribution 
that the Supreme Court made to jurisprudence during his tenure. David O. Stewart, A Life on 
the Court, 77 A.B.A. J. 62, 62 (1991); see also STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 418 
(quoting Justice Brennan during an interview at the end of his Supreme Court tenure that 
human dignity is “the basic premise on which I build everything under the Constitution”).  
 5 William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE 
BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 17, 18 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 
1997) [hereinafter Brennan, My Life]. 
 6 For a view of Justice Brennan’s deep respect for the Constitution, see Bill Moyers: In 
Search of the Constitution, Ep. 4 “Mr. Justice Brennan” (PBS television broadcast Apr. 16, 
1987). In a one-hour interview, Bill Moyers questioned Justice Brennan on his views of the 
Constitution. Fortunately, Justice Brennan’s passion for the Constitution and the country it 
established is preserved in this video. Id. 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
668 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:665 
 
Bill of Rights, and further advanced in 1868 by the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. It is an American vision of individual rights that is 
grounded in a belief in the inherent dignity of each individual. 7 In Paul v. Davis, 
Justice Brennan wrote, “I have always thought that one of this Court’s most 
important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against governmental violation of 
the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations 
of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.”8 Constitutional scholar 
Laurence Tribe recognized Justice Brennan as “the chief architect of the federal 
judiciary’s protection of individual rights.”9  
While Justice Brennan attained a status of prominence among Supreme Court 
Justices, his jurisprudence has drawn substantial criticism and is not widely 
embraced as relevant today. At the conclusion of a recent Brennan biography, the 
authors quote President Barack Obama as stating that while he viewed Justice 
Brennan as a personal hero, he did not necessarily think that his judicial philosophy 
is appropriate today.10 The biography further notes that all recent nominees for the 
Supreme Court have distanced themselves from Justice Brennan’s judicial 
philosophy.11  
The criticism of Justice Brennan is that, instead of interpreting the Constitution, 
he merely enacted his personal social philosophy.12 This criticism is entirely 
unfounded and reflects a misunderstanding of Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence which 
this article seeks to correct. In fact, Justice Brennan engaged in a principled 
interpretation of the Constitution which led to decisions that were at times in direct 
                                                           
 7 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004) (stating that respect for human dignity 
underlies the Constitution’s elusive but central protections of equality and liberty). Professor 
Tribe finds that a review of rulings by judges enacting fundamental freedoms under the 
Constitution shows “a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having 
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly locked in a legal double 
helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.” Id. at 
1897-98. Tribe wrote that the double helix of liberty and equality underlies the theme of 
dignity that ran through his own constitutional advocacy. Laurence H. Tribe, Introductory 
Remarks at the Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of Laurence Tribe, 42 TULSA 
L. REV. 797, 799 (Summer 2007). 
 8 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734-35 (1976). 
 9 Laurence H. Tribe, Architect of the Bill of Rights, 77 A.B.A. J. 47, 47 (1991). 
 10 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 546 (citing Barack Obama, interview with Detroit 
Free Press editorial board, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.freep. 
com/article/20081003/OPINION01/810030434/Obama-Aim-for-fundamental-change). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y, 875, 882 (2008) (stating that Justice Brennan engaged in legislating from the 
bench to produce what he deemed to be good consequences); Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, 
“Human Dignity,” and Constitutional Interpretation, in Meyer & Parent, supra note 3, at 129, 
134 (stating that respect for “human dignity” clearly is spun out of thin air, and constitutes 
Justice Brennan disquietingly interpreting the Constitution based on his own personal 
predilections).  
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opposition to the beliefs that he personally held.13 His decisions prohibiting prayer in 
the classroom and supporting a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion in some 
circumstances were difficult for him precisely because they were in conflict with his 
personal views.14 
When Justice Brennan was asked to identify the most difficult decision that he 
had to make as a Justice, he identified the school prayer cases because as a lifelong 
Roman Catholic, it was quite hard for him to say that prayer is not appropriate in 
public schools.15 In regard to abortion, Brennan stated, “I wouldn’t under any 
circumstances condone an abortion in my private life. But that has nothing to do 
with whether or not those who have different views are entitled to have them and are 
entitled to be protected in their exercise of them. That’s my job in applying and 
interpreting the Constitution.”16 And while he upheld the right of a political 
demonstrator to burn a flag in Texas v. Johnson,17 it is unlikely that Justice Brennan, 
a veteran of World War II who cherished the United States,18 would himself burn its 
flag. 
This article will show that Justice Brennan’s constitutional interpretation is 
grounded firmly in the views of one of the Framers of the United States Constitution, 
James Wilson, whose influence in the drafting of the Constitution is considered 
second only to that of James Madison.19 Justice Brennan once referred to James 
Wilson as one of “the most respected and influential” of the Framers.20 Although it is 
unknown to what extent Brennan was directly influenced by his knowledge of 
Wilson, the similarity of the views of both men on broad constitutional principles, 
and even on specific legal issues discussed in this article, is truly remarkable. Justice 
Brennan and James Wilson shared a commitment to the values of equality and 
liberty, based on their respect for the individual. Their shared constitutional vision 
should be returned to a contemporary relevance. 
                                                           
 13 Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1986), http://www 
.nytimes.com/books/97/07/06/reviews/brennan-interview.html. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. Justice Brennan began his Conference Memo for Marsh v. Chambers, which 
considered the constitutionality of legislative prayer, by stating that “[t]his is a hard and 
sensitive case, which I would have preferred not to have to confront. But it is here, and we 
should approach it in a principled manner consistent with our long-held view that the 
Establishment Clause requires the government to be absolutely neutral in matters of religion.” 
Conference Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (n.d.) (on file with the Library 
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 617, Folder 
9, Marsh v. Chambers). 
 16 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 372. 
 17 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see discussion, infra Part V.B.1. Justice 
Brennan held that the burning of the American flag during a protest of the government is 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.  
 18 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 37. 
 19 Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson 1742-1798 1 
(1997). 
 20 William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in 1 THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT CENTENNIAL 7-8 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) [hereinafter, Brennan, 
Landmarks]. 
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Part II lays a foundation by introducing James Wilson, whose important role in 
drafting the U.S. Constitution remains unnoticed by many constitutional scholars. It 
then relates James Wilson’s principle of the sovereignty of the people to Justice 
Brennan’s principle of human dignity, noting that both principles mean that the 
government should respect the individual. Part III shows that respect for the 
individual underlies Brennan’s and Wilson’s commitment to the values of equality 
and liberty. Part IV presents Justice Brennan’s view that James Wilson and the other 
Framers established a Constitution of broad principles that was intended to be 
interpreted by future generations. Part V discusses leading cases in which Justice 
Brennan advanced equality for racial minorities and women and liberty for all 
individuals to freely express their political views and make personal decisions 
without interference from the State. Part VI considers how a constitution based on 
the values of equality and liberty informs contemporary issues including Gay Rights, 
Affirmative Action, and Campaign Finance Regulation. Finally, Part VII concludes 
by discussing the hope, expressed by both Justice Brennan and James Wilson, that 
succeeding generations will preserve the Constitution’s promise of dignity, equality, 
and liberty for all Americans.  
II. THE FOUNDATION OF THE CONSTITUTION IS THE PEOPLE 
Part II introduces many readers to James Wilson, who remains largely unknown 
to most Americans.21 After providing background on James Wilson and his 
significant contributions as one of the framers of the United States Constitution, Part 
II.A relates James Wilson’s foundational principle of the sovereignty of the people to 
Justice Brennan’s principle of Human Dignity, finding that both emphasize the 
preeminence of the individual in the Constitution. Part II.B explores the formative 
life experiences of both men that may have contributed to their passionate 
commitment to the individual. Part II.C demonstrates Justice Brennan’s high respect 
for the individual by examining his adamant opposition to the death penalty, noting 
that James Wilson also thought that respect for the individual might invalidate the 
death penalty. 
A. Justice Brennan’s principle of Human Dignity Relates to James Wilson’s 
Principle of the Sovereignty of the People 
James Wilson was one of only six men to sign both the Declaration of 
Independence and the United States Constitution.22 He was a member of Congress 
under the Articles of Confederation, an active participant in the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 (the “Constitutional Convention”), and a delegate 
to the Pennsylania Ratifying Convention.23 Wilson served on the first United States 
Supreme Court as an associate justice.24 While teaching law at the College of 
                                                           
 21 See Nicholas Pederson, The Lost Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 257 (Summer 2010). The author seeks to explain how Wilson, described 
as “a constitutional colossus from the Revolutionary Era,” remains unknown to most 
Americans. Although one likely reason is that due to a propensity for land speculation in the 
new country, Wilson’s last years were spent attempting to avoid his creditors and debtor’s 
prison. Id. at 279-88.  
 22 HALL, supra note 19, at 20-21. 
 23 Id. at 20-22. 
 24 Id. at 25. 
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Philadelphia from 1790 to 1792, Wilson delivered a series of lectures on 
constitutional law that are remarkable because they were given by a Framer of the 
Constitution.25  
Wilson was born in Scotland in 1742, the son of a farmer, and immigrated to the 
United States in 1765 where he settled in Pennsylvania.26 He began the study of law 
in 1766 with Philadelphia lawyer John Dickinson.27 In 1767, he began to practice 
law in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.28 His law practice grew rapidly and he was 
recognized as an able young lawyer.29 While Wilson was applying himself to his law 
practice, the American colonies were showing unrest with their relationship to Great 
Britain, the Boston Tea Party occurred, and young lawyers such as Wilson were 
drawn to political discussions.30 Entering the public fray, James Wilson published a 
pamphlet titled “Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative 
Authority of the British Parliament” in 1774.31 Having gained recognition, Wilson 
was elected to the second Continental Congress in May 1775, representing 
Pennsylvania.32 When a Declaration of Independence was introduced to the 
Continental Congress, James Wilson voted for it.33 He was one of the eight framers 
of the Declaration of Independence to also be elected to he Constitutional 
Convention and one of only six to sign both documents.34 He attended the 
Constitutional Convention from start to finish and spoke more times (168) than any 
other member with the exception of Gouverneur Morris, also of Pennsylvania.35 
Wilson was appointed to the five-member Committee of Detail, which prepared the 
first draft of the United States Constitution.36 In 1789, President George Washington 
appointed James Wilson as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
where he contributed to the early formation of American law.37 
                                                           
 25 Id. at 27-28. Wilson’s law lectures were first published by his son Bird Wilson in 1804. 
References to the law lectures and other writings by James Wilson will cite to COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, VOLUME I AND II (Kermit L. Hall & David Mark Hall eds., 2007). 
The high regard in which James Wilson was held by his contemporaries is illustrated by the 
fact that his first law lecture was attended by President George Washington, the Vice-
President, and members of both houses of the Congress. HALL, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
 26 HALL, supra note 19, at 7, 10. 
 27 Charles Page Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father 1742-1798 24-25 (1956). 
 28 Id. at 30. 
 29 Id. at 37. 
 30 Id. at 50. 
 31 Id. at 54. 
 32 HALL, supra note 19, at 13. 
 33 Id. at 14. 
 34 Id. at 20-21. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 25. On Sept. 30, 1789, President George Washington wrote to James Wilson, “I 
experience peculiar pleasure in giving you notice of your appointment to the office of an 
Associate Judge in the Supreme Court of the United States. Considering the Judicial System 
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The cornerstone of James Wilson’s political thought is the principle of the 
sovereignty of the people of the United States.38 He believed that a government 
established by the Constitution is based directly on the people.39 For this reason, man 
does not exist for the government; the government exists to protect and promote the 
rights of man.40 At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the states were 
considered to have supremacy over the citzenry.41 James Wilson worked to shift the 
basis of the new government from the concept of state sovereignty to the sovereignty 
of the people themselves.42 During the Constitutional Convention, Wilson stated, 
“The General Government is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for 
certain political purposes—it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals 
composing them . . .”43 
When James Wilson served on the Committee of Detail, which wrote the first 
draft of the Constitution, he altered the first lines of the Preamble from “The people 
and the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island” to “We, the people 
of the states.”44 The Committee of Style later put the phrase into its final form, “We 
the people of the United States.” 45 James Wilson shifted the emphasis in the first 
words of the Constitution to recognize that the new government was founded on the 
people, not the states. During the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify the U.S. 
Constitution, Wilson explained to the delegates that the leading principle that 
pervades the American Constitution is that the supreme power resides in the people. 
The Constitution, therefore, opens with a solemn recognition of that principle: “We, 
                                                           
as the chief Pillar upon which our national Government must rest, I have thought it my duty to 
nominate for the high office, in that department, such men as I conceived would give dignity 
and lustre to our national character—and I flatter myself that the love which you have to our 
country, and a desire to promote the general happiness, will lead you to a ready acceptance of 
the enclosed commission.” LUCIEN HUGH ALEXANDER, JAMES WILSON: NATION BUILDER 
(1742-1798) 272 (1907).  
 38 HALL, supra note 19, at 25. 
 39 Id.  
 40 William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 901, 978 (2007-2008).  
 41 SMITH, supra note 27, at 273. 
 42 Id. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI, Justice James Wilson wrote that a state could be sued by 
a person because the state has only limited sovereignty, while the people enjoy a sovereignty 
that was never surrendered to a state. Id. at 453-466. In Chisholm, Justice Wilson established 
that the people of the United States formed a nation. Id. at 462-63. The principle of the 
sovereignty of the people holds even though Chisholm was abrogated by the 11th 
Amendment, which held only that a state could not be sued by a citizen of another state.  
 43 James Madison, Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention, 1787, in 1 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON VOLUME I 104 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007) [hereinafter Madison, Remarks]. 
 44 SMITH, supra note 27, at 246. 
 45 Ewald, supra note 40, at 988 n.241. 
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the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union…”46 In a 
lecture honoring Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo delivered in 1987, Justice Brennan 
cited James Wilson for the proposition that the United States government was 
formed by and for the people and that those who administer the laws are thus the 
servants of the people.47  
Wilson shows his emphasis on the sovereignty of the people by his advocacy for 
placing political power directly in the people of the United States. Wilson favored 
the direct election of both houses of the national legislature, as well as the direct 
election of the President, by the people.48 Although the Constitutional Convention 
determined that the House of Representatives would be elected by the people, it 
chose to have the Senate elected by the state legislatures.49 James Wilson’s proposal 
that the Senate should be chosen by the people was ultimately adopted in 1913 with 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.50 Wilson’s advocacy for the direct election 
of the President by the people was highly democratic for its time.51 A compromise, 
however, was adopted that involved creation of an Electoral College indirectly 
chosen by the people, which for Wilson was a better result than the election of the 
President by the Congress.52  
Like James Wilson, Justice Brennan believed that the U.S. Constitution is based 
on the preeminence of the people of the United States. Brennan noted that the choice 
of democratic self-governance showed the Framer’s faith in the people, 53 observing that 
“the supreme value of a democracy is the presumed worth of each individual.”54 
                                                           
 46 James Wilson, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the 
Constitution of the United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 193 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) [hereinafter Wilson, Ratifying Remarks]. 
 47 William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law”, 10 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 3, 15 (1988-89) [hereinafter Brennan, Reason, Passion].  
 48 According to James Madison’s notes of the Constitutional Convention, Wilson “wished 
to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention 
of the State Legislatures but the Executive also.” Madison, Remarks, supra note 43, at 85. 
 49 SMITH, supra note 27, at 256. 
 50 U.S. CONST. amend XVII. 
 51 SMITH, supra note 27, at 256. 
 52 Id. 
 53 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 439 (1985-1986) (also find at 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2 
(1985) [hereinafter Brennan, Contemporary Ratification]. This article was originally given as 
a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. on October 12, 1985. In the speech, 
Justice Brennan presented his approach to constitutional interpretation, and it remains the best 
source for Justice Brennan’s views on the Constitution, specifically that its text is “a sparkling 
vision of the supremacy of the human dignity of every individual.” Id. It is considered to be a 
response to criticism of the Court by United States Attorney General Edwin Meese in an 
address that Meese gave to the American Bar Association on July 9, 1985. The dueling 
speeches set up the debate on whether the Constitution should be interpreted based on the 
original intent of the founders or by applying its overarching principles to current 
circumstances. 
 54 Id. Justice Brennan cited a statement found in an article by H. Lasswell and M. 
McDougal as one of the best statements of the democratic ideal: “The supreme value of 
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Further, provisions in the Constitution illustrate that the Framers intended to form a 
government to protect the dignity of each person because they placed restraints on 
the power that the government could exert on individuals.55 These restraints are 
found in the body of the Constitution, including the prohibition on bills of attainder 
and ex post facto laws, and in the Bill of Rights.56 The adoption of federalism and a 
tripartite form of national government protected the individual by diffusing 
government power. By adopting these provisions, the Framers intended to limit the 
power of the government in order to protect the individual.57 
 Brennan adopted the term “dignity” to express the principle that each person 
possesses inherent worth or value under the Constitution.58 In 1793, while serving on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice James Wilson expressed the principle that the State 
derives its value from the inherent dignity of individuals, writing in an opinion that 
“[a] State, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of 
man, and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.”59 Justice 
Brennan believed that from its founding, the United States had been guided by a 
basic commitment to recognize the dignity of all persons within its borders.60 In his 
                                                           
democracy is the dignity and worth of the individual; hence, a democratic society is a 
commonwealth of mutual deference—a commonwealth where there is full opportunity to 
mature talent into socially creative skill, free from discrimination on grounds of religion, 
culture or class. It is a society in which such specific values as power, respect and knowledge 
are widely shared and are not concentrated in the hands of a single group, class or 
institution—the state—among the many institutions of society.” William J. Brennan, Jr., 
What’s Ahead for the New Lawyer, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 705, 707 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, 
New Lawyer] (citing H. Lasswell & M. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy; 
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 212 (1943)).  
 55 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 440.  
 56 William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication, 40 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 559, 569 
(1964-65) [hereinafter, Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication]. 
 57 Id. at 568. 
 58 Brennan’s definition of human dignity is consistent with the generally held view of the 
meaning of human dignity: 
In general, as presently conceived, human dignity requires that in any society every 
person count, that he (she) be considered worthy as an individual, not merely as part 
of the collectivity. Specifically, human dignity requires respect for every person’s 
physical and psychic integrity, for his (her) “personhood” before the law, for her (his) 
autonomy and freedom; these are not to be lightly sacrificed, even for the welfare of 
the majority or for the common good. 
Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in Meyer & Parent, supra note 3, at 
210-11; see also Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 183, 196-201 (2011) (discussing dignity as intrinsic human worth which 
attaches to each individual by virtue of being human).  
 59 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1973) (Justice Wilson stated that man is the 
“wonderfully made” work of his Creator and is sovereign over the State and Government 
which were made for him); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (advocating 
adoption of the Constitution as “the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness” (emphasis added)). 
 60 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970). 
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speeches, he frequently cited a 1964 American Bar Association (“ABA”) report that 
advocates for a jurisprudence that is based on the “recognition of human beings, as 
the most distinctive and important feature of the universe which confronts our 
senses, and of the function of law as the historic means of guaranteeing that pre-
eminence.”61 Justice David Souter, who assumed Justice Brennan’s seat on the 
Supreme Court following Brennan’s retirement in 1990, observed that Justice 
Brennan’s constitutional vision of human dignity was “a vision of worth to be 
recognized in every last person in the republic.”62  
The sovereignty or dignity of the individual is protected and preserved only when 
a government respects the innate rights of individuals. Justice Brennan observed that 
the Founding Fathers “set up in America a system of government based upon the 
dignity and inviolability of the individual soul, declaring that all men have God-
given inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”63 James Wilson 
also understood rights to exist from the natural state of man, and therefore, 
government, to claim validity, must recognize those rights.64 In fact, Wilson believed 
that the primary object of government is the protection of individual rights.65  
James Wilson worked to frame the Constitution to recognize that the 
fundamental unit of government is the individual human being.66 In his years on the 
                                                           
 61 Miriam Theresa Rooney, Report of ABA Section of International and Comparative 
Law, Committee on Comparative Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 195, 198 (1964). This 
report is cited by Justice Brennan with approval in numerous speeches. See, e.g., Brennan, 
Landmarks, supra note 20, at 10; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Role of the Court—The 
Challenge of the Future, in An Affair with Freedom 315, 321 (Stephen J. Friedman ed., 1967) 
[hereinafter Brennan, Challenge of the Future]; William J. Brennan, Jr., How Goes the 
Supreme Court, 36 Mercer L. Rev. 781, 787 (1984-85) [hereinafter Brennan, Supreme Court]; 
Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 56, at 563.  
 62 David H. Souter, Justice Brennan’s Place in Legal History, in Rosenkranz & Schwartz, 
supra note 5, at 308. Justice Souter noted that Justice Brennan dedicated his tenure on the 
Supreme Court to attacking the human diminishment implied by the Court’s ruling in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which sanctioned the separateness that perpetuated inequality. 
Id. Plessy held that a Louisiana statute requiring railway companies to maintain equal but 
separate accommodations for black and white passengers did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 63 William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Charitable Irish Society in Boston, Mass. (Mar. 
17, 1954), in Nomination of William J. Brennan, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in 103 CONG. REC. 3945 (1957). This early 
speech, which preceded Justice Brennan’s appointment to the Supreme Court, foreshadowed 
the focus on human dignity and individual rights that would drive his jurisprudence. Justice 
Brennan’s emphasis on the law’s respect for the inherent value of the individual is also 
evident in one of his New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. In Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 
417 (1956), where a policeman fired his gun at a suspected thief running down a narrow 
street, Justice Brennan observed that “[t]he law values human life too highly to allow an 
officer to proceed to the extremity of shooting an escaping offender who in fact has committed 
only a misdemeanor or lessor offense.”  
 64 Daniel N. Robinson, Do the People of the United States form a Nation? James Wilson’s 
Theory of Rights, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 287-89, 291 (2010). 
 65 James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 1053-54 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
 66 Ewald, supra note 40, at 978. 
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Court, Justice Brennan preserved Wilson’s focus on the individual by giving his 
attention to the “pulse of life beneath the official version of events,”67 observing that 
the Court’s rulings “emerged out of everyday human dramas . . . at the heart of each 
drama was a person who cried out for nothing more than common human dignity.”68 
Thus, Brennan’s opinions often carefully recount the real life stories of the persons 
at the center of the controversy,69 showing a deep concern with understanding the 
person affected by the Court’s rulings.70  
B. The Source of Justice Brennan’s and James Wilson’s Passion for the Individual 
The similarity of the constitutional vision shared by Justice Brennan and James 
Wilson, separated by almost two centuries, is remarkable. This Section explores the 
formative life experiences of both men that may have contributed to their adoption of 
a constitutional vision focused on the individual. James Wilson worked aggressively 
to frame a Constitution based on the supremacy of the people that recognized 
individual rights. Almost two centuries later, Justice Brennan interpreted the 
Constitution to be founded on the dignity of the individual, a principle that he 
persistently expressed in his decisions. The significance of the individual person was 
fundamental to the constitutional vision of both men. Although the two men lived in 
radically different times, there are experiences in their backgrounds that are similar.  
                                                           
 67 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 47, at 22. 
 68 Brennan, My Life, supra note 5, at 19. 
 69 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), illustrates 
his attention to the concrete realities of the lives of the individuals standing before the Court. 
A putative natural father who was not living with the child’s mother at the time of the child’s 
birth sought to establish paternity and a right to visitation. Id. at 115-14. Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court rejected any right of the putative father to seek visitation because history 
and tradition showed that there is no liberty interest that would protect his relationship to the 
child. Id. at 123-24. In contrast, Justice Brennan considered the evidence of a blood test 
indicating a 98.07% probability that the putative father was the natural father, as well as the 
interest that this purported father and child might have in a relationship to each other. Id. at 
141-47. He opined that the putative father was entitled to a hearing to prove his paternity and 
to determine whether visitation would be in the best interests of the child. Id. Justice 
Brennan’s evident impatience with the majority’s inability to recognize a parent-child interest 
outside its “pinched” view of a traditional family led him to write that “[t]he document that 
the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the living charter that I have taken to 
be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the 
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.” Id. at 141. 
 70 Justice Brennan’s attention to the individual is well-illustrated in a letter that he wrote to 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor during their consideration of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 688 (1984), which addressed the proper standard for effective assistance of counsel in the 
context of a death penalty case. Justice Brennan expressed his concern that defense counsel 
had not provided information to the sentencing judge concerning defendant “Washington the 
man” or testimony “from persons who knew the defendant before his crime spree and who 
could explain what kind of person he was.” Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar. 13, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 647, Strickland v. 
Washington). 
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James Wilson was a Scottish immigrant to the United States,71 while Justice 
Brennan was the son of Irish immigrants.72 Both were sons of working class 
fathers.73 James Wilson was the son of a farmer74 while Justice Brennan’s father 
worked as a laborer in a brewery, progressed to become a labor leader, and was 
elected as Director of Public Safety for the City of Newark, New Jersey.75 Although 
little is known about James Wilson’s father, it is recorded that Justice Brennan’s 
father was noted for his concern that government officials treat the individual with 
fairness.76 In 1925, he prohibited forced interrogation in the Newark police 
department.77 He later stated in a speech, “[t]the use of unnecessary force in making 
arrests, and violence in any form towards citizens, has been done away with. 
Nightsticks should last a long time. The police have been made the servants of the 
people and not their masters.”78 Brennan’s father echoes the belief held by both 
Justice Brennan and James Wilson that the government exists of, by, and for the 
people. 79  
Justice Wilson lived in the time of a great revolution in which he was one of the 
chief participants. Justice Brennan’s childhood was spent in an Irish neighborhood in 
Newark, New Jersey80 where he gained knowledge of the fight for freedom to 
establish an Irish Republic whose constitution respected religious freedom and 
liberty of personal expression.81 In a 1954 St. Patrick’s Day speech, Justice Brennan 
                                                           
 71 SMITH, supra note 27, at 3. During the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson rose to 
state that he was not a native to the country and that disabilities for immigrants adopted in the 
Constitution might incapacitate him from holding a position in the government that he had 
shared in the trust of making. Madison, Remarks, supra note 43, at 142-43.The proposal under 
discussion was the requirement of 14 years rather than 4 years of citizenship for non-native 
Americans to qualify for the Senate. Id. Wilson spoke of the degrading discrimination and 
mortification that adoption of the proposal would cause to him as an immigrant. Id. 
 72 STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 1, at 3. 
 73 Id. at 5; SMITH, supra note 27, at 3. 
 74 SMITH, supra note 27, at 3. 
 75 STERN & WERMEIL, supra, note 1, at 5-10.  
 76 KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL 24-25 (1993). Following his retirement from the 
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan was quoted as stating: “All I am, I am because of my father.” 
Id. at 281. 
 77 Id. at 25. 
 78 Id. 
 79 The principle was also stated by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address, resolving 
that “[this] nation shall have a new birth of freedom; and that this government of the people, 
by the people, for the people, shall not perish from this earth.” Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg 
Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 80 In a 1991 interview, Justice Brennan is quoted as stating, “[w]hat got me interested in 
people’s rights and liberties was the kind of neighborhood I was brought up in. I saw all kinds 
of suffering—people had to struggle. I saw the suffering of my mother, even though we were 
never without. We always had something to eat, we always had something to wear. But others 
in the neighborhood had a harder time.” Nat Hentoff, The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 12, 1990, at 46. 
 81 Brennan, Charitable Irish Society Speech, supra note 63, at 3938-39. 
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observed, “[t]he Irish love of individual liberty has naturally flowered in this 
America where the promise of that liberty has been realized as nowhere else on 
earth.”82  
Both Justice Brennan and James Wilson were religious men. Prior to 
immigrating to the United States, James Wilson had been preparing to enter the 
ministry.83 He attended the Divinity School at the University of St. Andrews.84 He 
appears to have retained his faith throughout his life, and religious references are 
frequently found in his writings.85 James Wilson’s law lectures are considered by 
some scholars to be significantly influenced by Christian natural law theory.86 Justice 
Brennan was raised in the Roman Catholic faith, attended Catholic services 
throughout his life, and was appointed to what was considered at the time to be the 
Catholic seat on the Supreme Court.87 In his jurisprudence, however, he consistently 
upheld the principle of separation of Church and State.88 Nevertheless, Brennan 
                                                           
 82 Id. at 3938. 
 83 HALL, supra note 19, at 7. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 72-75. 
 86 Id. at 36-39. Some scholars relate Justice Wilson’s philosophy to St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Id. at 37-38. Interestingly, a biographer wrote that Justice Brennan, during evenings at his 
Georgetown home, “curled up with the complete works of the liberal thirteenth-century 
Catholic theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas.” EISLER, supra note 76, at 183. Aquinas 
expounded a theory of natural law based on God’s eternal law, which may have influenced 
Justice Brennan. In the 1964 ABA report on new trends in jurisprudence, which is frequently 
cited by Justice Brennan, he stated that one might find “a return to the philosophy of St. 
Thomas Aquinas” and a resurgence of concepts of natural law. Brennan, Constitutional 
Adjudication, supra note 56, at 563.  
 87 Justice Brennan took the “Catholic seat” on the Supreme Court that had been vacant 
since the death of Justice Frank Murphy in 1949, the Catholic justice preceding Brennan. 
Leeds, supra note 15, at 15. Justice Murphy had also recognized a principle of human dignity 
in the Constitution. In his dissent in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 135 (1945), Justice 
Murphy stated that an African-American citizen who had been beaten to death by police 
officers had been denied the “respect and fair treatment that befits the dignity of man, a 
dignity that is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution.” Justice Murphy also cited 
“dignity” in a dissent from a decision affirming the conviction of an American citizen of 
Japanese descent who had refused to obey an order to leave his home during World War II. 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, Justice Murphy noted that 
the race-based order to abandon his home adopted “one of the cruelest rationales used by our 
enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to 
discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow.” Id. at 240; 
see also Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (observing that the peoples of the United 
States share a belief in the dignity of the individual). 
 88 Justice Brennan believed that the Constitution mandated a separation of church and 
state. See Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled in part by 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (school district’s provision of educational program to 
students in religious schools violates the Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 808 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative prayer clearly violates the 
Establishment Clause principle of separation of church and state); Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the constitution 
mandates that religious matters be left to the conscience of the citizen); Sherbert v. Verner, 
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believed Catholic social teaching had adopted the concept of human dignity, which 
derived from the belief that man was created in the image of God.89 Justice Brennan 
echoed this thought in a speech to the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1964, stating, 
“the Old and New Testament teach that all men have rights - that every individual 
has Rights because as a child of God he is endowed with human dignity.”90  
It is likely that their religious sentiments influenced both Justice Brennan and 
James Wilson’s commitment to the individual in their constitutional jurisprudence. 
As Justice Brennan’s close friend, Judge David L. Bazelon observed, however, one 
can only speculate in what fire Justice Brennan’s convictions were forged.91 But it is 
certain that Justice Brennan saw in the Constitution the same core principle of the 
supremacy of the people that James Wilson labored exhaustively to place there. 
C. The Dignity of Man Destroyed by the Death Penalty 
Justice Brennan’s commitment to the dignity of each individual is best shown by 
his adamant opposition to the death penalty, which he viewed as an act by the State 
“so severe as to be utterly and irreversibly degrading to the very essence of human 
dignity.”92 James Wilson appears to have accepted the concept of a death penalty for 
serious crimes such as murder; although, he also considered whether respect for the 
individual might call into question the legitimacy of capital punishment.93 Justice 
Brennan, however, took an absolutist position that it was unconstitutional in all 
circumstances because by destroying the individual, respect for human dignity is 
totally denied.94  
Justice Brennan wrote, “capital punishment is under all circumstances cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.”95 He 
expressed this opinion for the first time in his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia,96 
                                                           
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (stating that the door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly 
closed against any governmental regulation of religious belief). 
 89 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 662 (2008). The Catholic Church adopted “human dignity” as the 
rallying cry for the social teaching developed at the end of the 19th century and it was further 
developed in papal encyclicals. Id.  
 90 William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Louis Marshall Award Dinner of the Jewish 
Theological Seminary of America in New York City (Nov. 15, 1964). 
 91 David L. Bazelon, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 282, 285 (1980). Judge Bazelon sat on the D.C. Circuit. He met Brennan on October 16, 
1956, the day on which Brennan became an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and 
over the years counted him as a “cherished friend.” Id. at 282. 
 92 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 444. 
 93 HALL, supra note 19, at 57-58. 
 94 EISLER, supra note 76, at 244-46. 
 95 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 443. 
 96 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated that 
the judiciary has the fundamental responsibility to enforce the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause found in the Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights by applying constitutional 
principles to its interpretation. Id. at 269, 271. He applied the principle that the Constitution 
respects human dignity in interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Id.  
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the 1972 Supreme Court case that invalidated the death penalty in every state.97 He 
wrote, “[t]he state, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their 
intrinsic worth as human beings. A punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ therefore, if it 
does not comport with human dignity.”98 Although Justice Brennan would likely 
have rested on it being self-evident that the destruction of human life cannot comport 
with human dignity, he provided additional guidance for courts to apply in 
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual: 
The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: If a punishment is 
unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted 
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if 
there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more 
effectively than some less severe punishment, then the continued 
infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the 
State may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those 
convicted of crimes.99 
Brennan found the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment under this 
test.100 He concluded: “[d]eath is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; 
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by 
contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves 
any penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of 
imprisonment.”101  
Four years after invalidating the death penalty, the Court reversed course and 
reinstated it in Gregg v. Georgia.102 Justice Brennan wrote a short dissent in Gregg, 
which confirmed the reasoning of his concurring opinion in Furman that the death 
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.103 After the Court’s ruling in Gregg, Brennan dissented in every 
case upholding the death penalty and in every instance in which the Court declined 
to hear an appeal from a death row inmate.104 In regard to the death penalty, Brennan 
                                                           
 97 Id. at 240. 
 98 Id. at 270 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)) (stating that the basic concept 
underlying the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is “nothing less 
than the dignity of man”). 
 99 Id. at 282. 
 100 Id. at 305. 
 101 Id. Justice Brennan’s view that the death penalty was virtually totally rejected by 
contemporary society was likely an overstatement of public opinion at the time. 
 102 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 103 Id. at 227 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
 104 See, e.g., Alvord v. Florida, 428 U.S. 923, 923-24 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating “[p]etitoner contends that he was unconstitutionally-convicted because a statement he 
made during in-custody interrogation was admitted in evidence during the prosecution’s case-
in-chief, despite the absence of any warning to petitioner that if he could not afford an 
attorney one would be appointed to represent him before questioning. On the record in this 
case, we would grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument. In any event, the imposition 
and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
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found that it was unconstitutional in all circumstances because when the State 
destroys the individual it denies that individual all of his dignity.105 Thus, Justice 
Brennan’s death penalty jurisprudence demonstrates the firmness of his belief in the 
constitutional principle of human dignity.106  
III. THE VALUES OF EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 
Part III shows how the values of equality and liberty, based on respect for the 
individual, were expressed by Justice Brennan and James Wilson. Part III.A 
establishes that Brennan and Wilson both held that the dignity and sovereignty of the 
individual under the Constitution means that all persons have a right to equality and 
liberty. Part III.B shows that James Wilson’s commitment to equality was 
progressive for its time, while Justice Brennan authored transformational decisions 
furthering the principle of equality. Part III.C remarks that Justice Brennan and 
James Wilson supported proportional representation because it secured equality of 
citizenship. Part III.D highlights Brennan’s and Wilson’s commitment to individual 
liberty. Finally, Part III.E illustrates the significance of individual liberty to both 
Wilson and Brennan, who advocated for criminal procedures that protect even the 
liberty of those charged with committing heinous crimes.  
A. All Men Are, by Nature, Equal and Free 
Justice Brennan and James Wilson shared the belief that the United States 
Constitution is based on the principle that the United States is comprised of free and 
equal people.107 Among the advantages of a constitutional democracy, James Wilson 
noted, are the rights to liberty and equal laws for its citizens.108 Wilson saw that 
principle expressly stated in the Declaration of Independence,109 while Justice 
Brennan observed that the Declaration was grounded in the belief that all men are 
created equal and endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights.110 James 
Wilson may have contributed to Thomas Jefferson’s seminal phrase in the 
                                                           
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We would therefore grant certiorari and 
vacate judgment in this case insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 105 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305. 
 106 The Court continues to find that the Eighth Amendment implicates human dignity. 
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By 
protecting even those accused of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of 
government to respect the dignity of all persons.”) The Court, however, has not yet agreed 
with Justice Brennan that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it constitutes a total 
denial of human dignity.  
 107 HALL, supra note 19, at 96-98. 
 108 Wilson, Ratifying Remarks, supra note 46, at 192. 
 109 John Marshall Harlan, James Wilson and the Formation of the Constitution, 34 AM. L. 
REV. 481, 483 (1900). 
 110 William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Monmouth Rotary Club (Feb. 23, 1955), in 
Nomination of William J. Brennan, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
85th Cong. 28 (1957), reprinted in 103 CONG. REC. 3939, 3940 (1957). 
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Declaration that “all men are created equal” and that they are “endowed by their 
creator with certain inalienable rights” among which is liberty. In 1774, two years 
before Jefferson penned the Declaration, James Wilson wrote in his first published 
pamphlet that “All men are, by nature, equal and free.”111 Jefferson later wrote that 
he based the Declaration on the sentiments of the day including those expressed in 
printed essays.112 
From an early time in the formation of the United States, equality and liberty 
have been recognized as basic rights of the individual. For Justice Brennan and 
James Wilson, these rights derive from a fundamental recognition of the dignity and 
supremacy of the individual. This Part will show that their views on specific 
constitutional issues reflect the principles of equality and liberty. 
B. Equality 
Paradoxically, the Founding Fathers expounded the ideal of equality in their 
Declaration of Independence while maintaining a society that included slaves and 
few rights for women.113 In his reflection on the 1987 Bicentennial of the United 
States Constitution, Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African American appointed 
to the Supreme Court in 1967, noted that when the Founding Fathers used the phrase 
“We the People” in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America’s 
inhabitants, specifically women and slaves.114  
While Justice Marshall expressed his impatience with the defense that the 
Founders’ approach to equality was a product of the times in which they lived,115 it is 
true that for his time, James Wilson was among the strongest supporters of the 
concept that the people who formed the union were equal in rights. He wrote: 
                                                           
 111 James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of 
the British Parliament (1774) in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 4 (Kermit L. Hall & 
Mark David Hall eds., 2007); see also John Marshall Harlan, supra note 109, at 483 (“[I]n 
1774, when only thirty-two years of age, in a pamphlet relating to the legislative authority of 
the British Parliament and which attracted great attention, Wilson disclosed the broad ground 
upon which his political faith rested, by declaring that all men—not some men, not men of 
any particular race or color, but ‘all men are by nature equal and free’—the same great 
principle subsequently embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 112 Thomas Jefferson wrote that the Declaration of Independence was not his original 
contribution, but rather “it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to 
give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All of its authority 
rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in 
letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right .” Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-henry-lee/. 
 113 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 114 Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). Justice Marshall noted that on the basic right to vote, the 
Framers excluded African-Americans, although they were considered to be three-fifths of a 
person for representational purposes, and women did not gain the right to vote for another 130 
years. Id.  
 115 Id. at 3. 
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However great the variety and inequality of men may be with regard to 
virtue, talents, taste, and acquirements; there is still one aspect, in which 
all men in society, previous to civil government are equal. With regard to 
all, there is an equality in rights and obligations . . . The natural rights and 
duties of man belong equally to all. Each forms a part of that great 
system, whose greatest interest and happiness are intended by all the laws 
of God and nature. These laws prohibit the wisest and the most powerful 
from inflicting misery on the meanest and most ignorant; and from 
depriving them of their just acquisitions.116  
Some members of the Constitutional Convention argued that suffrage for 
national elections should be restricted to those who held property.117 James Wilson, 
however, advocated that suffrage should be granted to all free adult males.118 For his 
time, universal suffrage for all free adult males was a progressive position that 
evidenced a substantial commitment to human equality.119 In regard to slavery, 
Wilson stated that the Constitution gave Congress the power to prohibit the 
importation of slaves beginning in 1808, a power that he believed laid “the 
foundation for the banishing of slavery out of this country” although at a time more 
distant than he would wish.120 Additionally, he observed that “this reproachful trade” 
will never be introduced in the new states which would be formed.121 He concluded 
that this restriction on slavery was “all that could be obtained. I am sorry it was no 
more; but from this I think there is reason to hope that yet a few years, and it will be 
prohibited altogether.”122 
Equality means that differences in race, gender, religion, or wealth are not 
relevant to questions of fundamental rights. Two centuries later, and following the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan was able to greatly expand 
on James Wilson’s principle that all men are, by their nature, equal. Justice 
Brennan’s opinions that furthered the achievement of equality for racial minorities 
and women will be discussed in Part V.A of this article. 
C. Equality of Citizenship: Baker v. Carr 
The most fundamental right in a democracy is the right to vote. Justice Brennan 
and James Wilson both believed that each elector’s vote should have equal weight 
and, for this reason, they both supported proportional representation.123 During the 
Constitutional Convention, James Wilson supported the concept of “one person-one 
vote”. James Madison’s journal from the convention notes: 
                                                           
 116 HALL, supra note 19, at 96. 
 117 Id. at 108-9. 
 118 Id. at 108. 
 119 Ewald, supra note 40, at 1008. 
 120 Wilson, Ratifying Remarks, supra note 46, at 210. Wilson owned one domestic slave, 
whom he later freed. Pederson, supra note 21, at 273, 275. 
 121 Wilson, Ratifying Remarks, supra note 46, at 210. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Ewald, supra note 40, at 945. 
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[Mr. Wilson] entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional 
representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was 
derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal 
n[umber] of representatives, and different numbers of people different 
numbers of representatives.124 
Further, when delegates at the Constitutional Convention sought to give the 
maritime states greater political power than the newer western states that one day 
might have greater populations, Wilson interjected in opposition that “all men 
wherever placed have equal rights.”125 James Wilson never deviated from his 
insistence that each person’s vote should have equal weight in the new 
government.126 
One of Justice Brennan’s most transformational decisions is his opinion for the 
Court in Baker v. Carr,127 which held that the method by which state legislatures 
apportion legislative districts affects a basic right that is justiciable by courts.128 
Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that Baker v. Carr was the foundation for all 
subsequent decisions guaranteeing equal weight to the vote of every American 
citizen129 and Justice Brennan related the decision to the principle of human dignity 
reflecting that “[r]ecognition of the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ as a 
constitutional principle redeems the promise of self-governance by affirming the 
essential dignity of every citizen in the right to equal participation in the democratic 
process.”130  
Although Baker v. Carr did not reach the merits of the legislative apportionment 
at issue, Justice Brennan foreshadowed the application of equal protection to voting 
rights cases, stating that “[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are 
well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a 
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”131 He 
concluded that “the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protection present a 
                                                           
 124 Madison, Remarks, supra note 43, at 93; Ewald, supra note 40, at 901. 
 125 Madison, Remarks, supra note 43, at 115; Ewald, supra note 40, at 980. 
 126 Ewald, supra note 40, at 970. 
 127 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1966). When Justice Brennan 
read the opinion from the bench, Warren slipped him a hand-written note stating: “Bill: It is a 
great day for the (Irish) country. EW” Handwritten Note from Chief Justice Earl Warren to 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (n.d.) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 64, Folder 4, Baker v. Carr). 
 130 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 442. 
 131 Baker, 369 U.S. at 226. Justice Brennan routinely planted a seed in his opinions that 
would germinate into new constitutional doctrine in a subsequent case. Richard A. Posner, 
Tribute to Justice Brennan, 111 HARV. L. REV. 9, 11 (1997). Laurence Tribe also noted that 
one of the crucial elements in Brennan’s work as a constitutional architect was his ability to 
craft an opinion in a way that would lay the foundation for future decisions. Laurence H. 
Tribe, In Memorium: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 41, 44 (1997). 
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justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial 
and decision.”132  
Prior to Justice Brennan’s Baker ruling in 1962, many states had not 
reapportioned their congressional and state legislative districts for decades, despite 
the fact that the Country’s population had substantially shifted from rural to urban 
areas.133 Incumbent state legislators did not want to enact re-districting because it 
would result in a loss of their own power.134 At issue in Baker was Tennessee’s 
standard for allocating legislative representation among its counties.135 To show how 
Tennessee’s policies affected real people, a Brennan law clerk prepared a chart, 
based on the exhibits that were part of the record, that showed disproportionate 
representation among Tennessee counties of the same size, disproportionate 
populations among counties with the same representation, and situations in which 
counties with populations one-sixth the size of other counties had up to three times 
as many representatives.136 These facts showed that Tennessee’s citizens did not 
have equal representation in their government. 
Earlier decisions, such as Colgrove v. Green,137 held that cases raising issues 
pertaining to legislative representation presented non-justiciable political 
questions.138 Justice Brennan’s decision in Baker, however, opened the courthouse 
doors to subsequent voting rights cases.139 Two years after Baker, in Reynolds v. 
Sims,140 Justice Brennan joined Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion that established 
the substantive principle of “one-man, one-vote”.141 As a result of the holding in 
Baker, courts could now provide a forum to all persons seeking to enforce their equal 
right to participate in the democracy. 
Thus, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker substantially furthered the principle of 
proportional representation that James Wilson had articulated during the 
Constitutional Convention. Proportional Representation recognizes that each citizen 
in a democracy has an equal right to participate in the election of his representatives, 
and conversely, that a democracy is composed of individuals with equal rights. 
                                                           
 132 Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
 133 Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of 
Baker v. Carr, 95 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 685 (1995). 
 134 Id.  
 135 Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-188. 
 136 Conference Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Oct. 12, 1961) (on file 
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, 
Box 63, Folder 5, Baker v. Carr). 
 137 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 138 Id. at 552. 
 139 Mikva, supra note 133, at 686. 
 140 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 141 Id. at 558. 
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D. Liberty 
Justice Brennan and James Wilson advocated an expansive view of individual 
liberty. James Wilson observed that, “The Citizens of the United States, however 
different in some other respects, are well known to agree in one strongly marked 
feature of their character—a warm and keen sense of freedom and independence.”142 
And for this reason he continued, “The principles and dispositions of [the citizens of 
the United States] indicate, that in this government liberty shall reign triumphant.”143 
Wilson supported restrictions on the state to insure that individuals were not 
improperly deprived of their liberty.144 Additionally, he believed in the freedom of 
conscience and the right of the individual to make his own choices, stating: 
The right of private judgment is one of the greatest advantages of 
mankind; and is always considered as such. To be deprived of it is 
insufferable. To enjoy it lays a foundation for that peace of mind, which 
the laws cannot give, and for the loss of which the laws can offer no 
compensation.145  
Consistent with his view that individuals are entitled to liberty of thought, 
Wilson strongly supported the right of each individual to form and hold his own 
religious beliefs.146  
For Justice Brennan, “the ability independently to define one’s identity” is 
central to any concept of liberty.147 He explained: 
The constitutional vision of human dignity rejects the possibility of 
political orthodoxy imposed from above; it respects the right of each 
individual to form and to express political judgments, however far they 
may deviate from the mainstream and however unsettling they might be to 
the powerful or the elite. Recognition of these rights of expression and 
conscience frees up the private space for both intellectual and spiritual 
development, free of government dominance, either blatant or subtle.148  
Justice Brennan advocated strenuously for the fullest protection of those 
freedoms that preserve the integrity of the individual spirit, giving it a wide berth to 
express itself even in ways that might be unsettling to the majority. He was not 
concerned with the manner in which the individual develops; he did not endorse a set 
of thoughts or behaviors.149 His concern was simply that the individual be given the 
liberty to develop, preserving a domain of personal autonomy into which the 
government may not intrude. For this reason, Justice Brennan authored opinions that 
                                                           
 142 Wilson, Ratifying Remarks, supra note 46, at 179. 
 143 Id. at 187. 
 144 HALL, supra note 19, at 54. 
 145 Id. at 55. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 148 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 442-43. 
 149 Id. at 443. 
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promoted liberty of speech, thought, and action that will be discussed in Part V.B of 
this article. 
E. The Preservation of Liberty in Criminal Procedure 
The strongest evidence of Justice Brennan and James Wilson’s commitment to 
liberty is their advocacy for strong restraints on the government’s ability to deprive 
an individual of his liberty when he has been accused of a crime. By supporting 
liberty in the hard cases, the liberty of all citizens is preserved. Among the 
protections of individual liberty that James Wilson supported are: (1) the right to a 
fair trial prior to imprisonment; (2) grand jury indictment only under the higher 
standard of “certainty,” rather than the lower standard of probable cause; and (3) that 
the dissent of a single juror in a criminal trial should result in acquittal.150 
Justice Brennan similarly supported criminal procedures that protect individual 
liberty. Brennan’s view that the State must act with restraint when it confronts the 
individual is illustrated in the following exchange that he had with Chief Justice Earl 
Warren during their consideration of Miranda v. Arizona:151 
Earl Warren: “The root problem is the role society must assume, 
consistent with the federal constitution, in prosecuting individuals for 
crime.” 
Justice Brennan: “I would suggest that the root issue is the restraints 
society must observe consistent with the federal constitution, in 
prosecuting individuals for crime.”152  
Although a strong advocate for the rights of the accused, Justice Brennan 
recognized the competing interests involved, stating that “[w]here the police have 
ample evidence of a man’s guilt, but to be sure of their case put into evidence a 
confession obtained through coercion, the conflict arises between his right to a fair 
                                                           
 150 HALL, supra note 19, at 54. 
 151 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the prosecution may not use a 
defendant’s statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless there were procedural 
safeguards that ensured the defendant’s right against self-incrimination was preserved). Chief 
Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court stated, “the constitutional foundation underlying the 
privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and 
integrity of its citizens.” Id. at 460. 
 152 Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren (May 11, 1966) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Part I, Box 142, Folder 10, Miranda v. Arizona) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Warren’s 
opinion in Miranda opens with Justice Brennan’s words: “The cases before us raise questions 
which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints 
society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for 
crime.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. Justice Brennan served with Justice Warren on the 
Supreme Court for thirteen of the sixteen years that Warren presided as Chief Justice and 
described him as a “cherished friend.” William J. Brennan, Jr., In Memoriam: Earl Warren, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1974). Justice Brennan wrote that Justice Warren “strongly believed that 
individual human dignity was a primary value fostered and protected by the Constitution.” Id. 
at 3. Brennan observed that Warren “wrote Miranda v. Arizona, as a step toward enforcing a 
constitutional framework of criminal justice consistent with human dignity and democratic 
equality by mandating enlightened and civilized treatment by law enforcement officers of 
criminal suspects.” Id.  
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prosecution and society’s right to protection against his depravity.”153 He advised 
that these are conflicts that require the Court to make difficult choices in order to 
protect constitutional rights for everyone.154 
In 1961, Justice Brennan titled a speech he gave on issues of criminal law, “The 
Essential Dignity of Man.”155 He addressed the speech to a volunteer association of 
New Jersey citizens that had been formed to make improvements to the state’s 
corrections system.156 He commended their efforts, noting that “[t]he law breaker has 
not been an appealing object of sympathy or concern.”157 And he addressed the 
question of why the average citizen should be concerned about the criminal: 
Foremost is our boast that the supreme value of our American democracy 
is the value we give the dignity and worth of the individual. We recognize 
this value when we accuse the offender of the crime before we convict 
him. We insist that, however guilty, he shall not go to prison except upon 
indictment and conviction by a jury of his peers, and then only if the State 
can persuade the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We will not 
allow his guilt to be based upon a confession coerced from him, and we 
give him the shield of the privilege against self-incrimination so that he 
shall not be convicted out of his own mouth. We insist that his trial be fair 
and the decision be reached by an impartial jury. All of these safeguards 
stem from the firm conviction of a free society that these safeguards are 
essential to preserve simple human dignity.158 
In his many years on the Court following this speech, Justice Brennan strove to 
assure that the Court safeguarded the essential dignity and right to liberty of criminal 
defendants: recognizing that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution has a 
right to have appointed counsel;159 allowing state criminal defendants to obtain a full 
and fair hearing on important constitutional claims;160 finding that a post-indictment 
line-up is a critical stage of the prosecution at which defendant is entitled to aid of 
counsel;161 recognizing that the due process clause requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in a criminal trial;162 and arguing for a strict application of the 
                                                           
 153 Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 56, at 565.  
 154 Id. 
 155 William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks to the Morrow Citizens Association of Correction in 
Newark, New Jersey (Nov. 21, 1961), available at http://www. 
chattanoogaendeavors.com/brennan/speech. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 1. 
 158 Id. at 4. 
 159 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Justice Brennan joined Justice Black’s 
opinion for the Court). 
 160 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391(1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991). 
 161 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 162 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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exclusionary rule as a personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.163 
By advocating for the strong protection of the individual’s right to liberty, even 
in the hard cases involving those accused of crimes, Justice Brennan and James 
Wilson sought to protect the liberty of all Americans.  
IV. A CONSTITUTION OF PRINCIPLES 
Part III discussed the values of equality and liberty, derived from the principle of 
individual dignity, that James Wilson expressed in the drafting of the Constitution in 
the eighteenth-century, and that Justice Brennan upheld during the twentieth-century. 
Part IV discusses Justice Brennan’s strongly-held belief that James Wilson and his 
contemporaries at the Constitutional Convention framed a Constitution for future 
generations that would require interpretation in light of changing times. He believed 
that the Constitution’s values of equality and liberty, renewed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, may be interpreted by each succeeding generation of judges in the light 
of the circumstances of the time.  
Justice Brennan believed that the Framers deliberately chose general language 
because they “were formulating a Constitution for the illimitable future.”164 At the 
Constitutional Convention, James Wilson explicitly stated this principle, advising 
the other Framers that, “We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for 
future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment.”165 
For this reason, Brennan observed that the Framers wrote in broad outlines so that 
the past would not excessively govern the future.166 As American society has 
evolved, the foundational principles of the Constitution have been more fully 
realized. For example, although the Nation was founded on the principle that all men 
are created equal, Justice Brennan observed that “the Framers of our Constitution, to 
forge Thirteen Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised [the] principle of 
equality with its antithesis: slavery.”167 It took a Civil War to clarify that the 
Constitution was inconsistent with human slavery.  
Justice Brennan wrote that “the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static 
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of 
its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”168 He 
expressed disapproval of constitutional interpretation that rests on an attempt to 
discern how the Framers would decide today’s issues, based on the positions they 
                                                           
 163 U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 164 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a 
Charter of Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) [hereinafter Brennan, Charter of 
Human Rights]. 
 165 Madison, Remarks, supra note 43, at 125. 
 166 Brennan, Charter of Human Rights, supra note 164, at 7. 
 167 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (n.d.) (draft bench statement) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 441, Folder 5, 
Board of Regents v. Bakke). 
 168 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 438. “Those who would restrict 
claims of right to the values of 1789 specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a blind 
eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to changes of social 
circumstance.” Id. at 436. 
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took in the eighteenth century.169 He found this method of interpretation inherently 
unreliable because the sources for their views provide ambiguous evidence further 
distorted by the distance of two centuries.170 It is the judge’s role to apply the 
Constitution’s broadly worded principles to circumstances that were not 
contemplated when those principles were first articulated.171 
In fact, it trivializes the work that James Wilson did to frame a Constitution for 
the ages, to attempt to uncover whether or not Wilson’s children read Bible passages 
in their eighteenth-century schoolhouse, rather than considering whether in the 
diverse public schools of today, it violates the freedom of religion of all school 
children to be required to read religious texts. Further, it is unlikely that when James 
Wilson affirmed a Constitution that considered African-Americans to count as three-
fifths of a person, that he would have contemplated that a person of African-
American heritage would be President or that a woman would be a serious contender 
for the office. 
The role of the judge in interpreting the Constitution’s broad principles is 
challenging. It would be easier for judges to apply specific and simple legal rules. 
Justice Brennan noted that the Framers recognized the demands of constitutional 
interpretation, and more importantly, the need for judges to be independent of 
political pressures while engaged in this interpretation.172 Therefore, the Constitution 
grants life tenure and a secure salary to federal judges.173 Justice Brennan cited with 
approval James Wilson’s advocacy for a strong and independent judiciary: 
                                                           
 169 Id. at 435 
 170 Id. Brennan was derisive of attempts to constrain the Constitution to life in 1791. 
“Indeed, if it were possible to find answers to all constitutional questions by reference to 
historical practices, we would not need judges. Courts could be staffed by professional 
historians who could be instructed to compile a master list of life in 1791. Cases could be 
decided based on whether a challenged practice or rule or procedure could be located on that 
great list.” William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A 
View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 326 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Death Penalty 
View]. In Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963), Brennan noted 
that searching for the advice of the Founding Fathers on the issue of whether bible readings 
should be allowed in schools would be futile because the historical record is at best ambiguous 
and statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition. 
 171 Brennan, Death Penalty View, supra note 170, at 326. In considering whether legislative 
prayer is constitutional, Justice Brennan expressed his view of the role that historical practice 
should have in constitutional interpretation: 
I recognize that the 1st Congress approved the practice of legislative prayer. But that 
historical fact cannot be dispositive: it is entirely possible that the same men who 
wrote a broad and lasting mandate for religious neutrality into the Constitution would, 
under pressures or passions of the moment, violate the very principle they had 
enacted. History can give us guidance in a broad sense; it cannot validate forever 
every piece of legislation passed by the First Congress or prevent us from reading the 
Constitution in light of the realities of the day and the requirements of evolving legal 
principle. 
Conference Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 15. 
 172 Brennan, Death Penalty View, supra note 170, at 326. 
 173 Id. (stating that the Framers intended that judges would have the responsibility, burden, 
and challenge of working with the majestic generalities of the Constitution). 
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James Wilson of Pennsylvania pointed out that “the Judges would be in a 
bad situation if made to depend on any gust of faction which might 
prevail in the two [political] branches of government.” The result of life 
tenure for judges, he said, will be “that private property, so far as it comes 
before the courts, and personal liberty, so far as it is not forfeited by 
crimes, will be guarded with firmness and watchfulness.” “I believe,” he 
went on, “that public happiness, personal liberty and private property 
depend essentially upon the able and upright determinations of 
independent judges.”174 
Constitutional interpretation, however, is not reduced to the mere imposition of 
the judge’s personal views of morality or policy. For Justice Brennan, a judge’s 
application of his personal philosophy to constitutional interpretation is held in 
check because “judges have to proceed and to persuade by reasoned argument in a 
public context.”175 The judge is always aware that the public must find legitimacy in 
his decisions. 
Guided by the principles of equality and liberty, constitutional interpretation can 
be counter-majoritarian. Justice Brennan stated that “[i]t is the very purpose of our 
Constitution - and particularly of the Bill of Rights - to declare certain values 
transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.”176 Thus courts 
have a special responsibility to protect individual rights even though those rights 
may not be affirmed by the democratic will of the majority.177 As a result, “there are 
circumstances in which the majority must yield to the greater national interest in the 
protection of rights.”178 James Wilson observed, “On one side, indeed, there stands a 
single individual; on the other side, perhaps, there stand millions; but right is 
weighed by principle; it is not estimated by numbers.”179  
                                                           
 174 Brennan, Landmarks, supra note 20, at 8; see also Wilson, Ratifying Remarks, supra 
note 46, at 237.  
 175 Brennan, Death Penalty View, supra note 170, at 329. Justice Brennan described the 
public context of his work interpreting the Constitution: 
My encounters with the constitutional text are not purely or even primarily 
introspective: the Constitution cannot be for me simply a contemplative haven for 
private moral reflection. My relation to this great text is inescapably public. That is 
not to say that my reading of the text is not a personal reading, only that the personal 
reading perforce occurs in a public context and is open to critical scrutiny from all 
quarters. The Constitution is fundamentally a public text—the monumental charter of 
a government and a people—and a Justice of the Supreme Court must apply it to 
resolve public controversies. 
Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 433.  
 176 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 436. 
 177 This special role of the courts was anticipated by James Madison, who stated, 
“independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians 
of [constitutional] rights.” Brennan, Challenge of the Future, supra note 61, at 332 (citing 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834)). 
 178 Brennan, Charter of Human Rights, supra note 164, at 6. 
 179 James Wilson, Of Citizens and Aliens, Law Lectures, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON 1043 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).  
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In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution affirmed the values of 
equality and liberty that James Wilson believed the government must preserve for its 
citizens.180 Within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses,181 Justice Brennan found “the prime tool by which we as citizens are 
striving to shape a society which fully champions the dignity and worth of the 
individual as its supreme value.”182 The Due Process Clause demands that the 
government treat individuals with respect.183 Due process asks “whether government 
has treated someone fairly, whether individual dignity has been honored, whether the 
worth of an individual has been acknowledged.”184 It assures that personal liberties 
are not unduly forfeited.185 In regard to the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Brennan 
viewed it as fundamental to a constitutional democracy because it provided equality 
of rights and opportunities for all people of the nation to share in the abundance of 
American life.186 Differences in age, sex, race, and religion are not relevant to the 
manner in which the government treats its citizens.187 Relying on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reaffirmation of the principles of equality and liberty and holding a 
view that constitutional interpretation should reflect current realities, Justice Brennan 
substantially furthered James Wilson’s assertion that “All men, by their nature, are 
Equal and Free.” 
V. JUSTICE BRENNAN ADVANCES EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 
James Wilson served as a justice on the first United States Supreme Court, 
however, he wrote fewer than two dozen opinions.188 In contrast, Justice Brennan 
                                                           
 180 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra Part III.A (discussing the importance of equality 
and liberty to Wilson). 
 181 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 182 Brennan, Landmarks, supra note 20, at 1.  
 183 Brennan, Reason, Passion, supra note 47, at 22. 
 184 Id. at 16.  
 185 Id. at 15-16.  
 186 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Equality Principle in American Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 921, 921-22 (1987). 
 187 In the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Brennan also found a means to recognize certain 
fundamental rights. Many of the issues related to fundamental rights arise in the context of the 
unequal acknowledgment of those rights. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636-38 
(1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Brennan found that a 
state’s one-year residency requirement for the receipt of public assistance created two classes 
of needy resident families, indistinguishable except that one class resided in the state for a 
longer period of time. The classification implicated interstate travel, which Brennan found to 
be a fundamental right. He, therefore, applied strict scrutiny review and held that the residency 
requirement was unconstitutional. Id. The Shapiro opinion is noted for establishing the 
application of strict scrutiny to fundamental rights. Id. at 638. 
 188 HALL, supra note 19, at 25. 
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served on the Court for thirty-four years and authored well over one thousand 
opinions.189 The breadth of issues that came before Justice Brennan far out-numbered 
the issues that Justice Wilson considered. Part V reviews leading cases that Justice 
Brennan authored upholding the values of equality and liberty based on his 
constitutional vision of human dignity.  
Part V.A.1 highlights Justice Brennan’s opinions that furthered racial equality. 
The strength of Justice Brennan’s commitment to equality is demonstrated in Green 
v. County School Board of New Kent County, which held that equality cannot be 
delayed, it must be achieved now.190 Part V.A.2 discusses Justice Brennan’s effort to 
have the strictest standard of review applied to gender claims in Frontiero v. 
Richardson.191 Part V.A.3 highlights Justice Brennan’s decision in Goldberg v. 
Kelly,192 which secured an equal right to due process for welfare recipients and 
suggested that individuals may have a positive right to government benefits ensuring 
minimal subsistence.193 
In Part V.B.1, Justice Brennan’s commitment to liberty of expression is shown 
by Texas v. Johnson,194 which upheld the right of an individual to protest 
government policies by burning an American flag, even if that act would not be 
approved by the majority of citizens.195 Part V.B.2 concludes with a review of Justice 
Brennan’s substantial contribution to the recognition of a fundamental right to 
privacy, which allows each individual liberty in decisions that affect his person.  
A. Equality 
1. Racial Equality: Discrimination Eliminated Root and Branch 
Justice Brennan joined the Supreme Court two years after the historic opinion in 
Brown v. Board. of Education was issued in May 1954.196 Thurgood Marshall, the 
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund lawyer who argued the case in the Supreme Court, 
later joined the Court in 1967.197 He became one of Justice Brennan’s closest 
colleagues on the Court.198 Upon Justice Brennan’s retirement from the Court, 
Justice Marshall wrote that his friend and colleague, Bill Brennan, was irreplaceable 
as a justice, distinguished by his unwavering commitment to basic principles of civil 
rights.199 
                                                           
 189 See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1. 
 190 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968) (emphasis added).  
 191 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).  
 192 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).  
 193 Id. at 263-64, 268.  
 194 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).  
 195 Id. at 419, 435. 
 196 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 197 Id. at 484. 
 198 Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1 
(1990). 
 199 Id. at 1-2.  
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Although Justice Brennan did not hear Thurgood Marshall argue Brown, Brennan 
was on the Supreme Court bench in 1958 when Marshall argued the case of Cooper 
v. Aaron.200 At issue in Cooper was whether the Little Rock, Arkansas School Board 
could suspend its school desegregation plan in response to strong resistance from the 
state’s governor and others opposed to the desegregation of the schools, specifically 
Little Rock’s Central High School.201 Justice Brennan recalled that Marshall’s 
“forceful presentation helped influence the Court’s unprecedented and decisive” 
order to reinstate “the desegregation order on the day after oral argument.”202 In 
response to the school board’s recitation of the difficulties it would encounter in 
implementing the desegregation plan, Marshall reminded the Court that the issues at 
hand were the constitutional rights of the African-American children which should 
not be watered down simply because democracy is tough.203 Although Cooper v. 
Aaron was a plurality decision, Justice Brennan is credited with being its principal 
author.204 The decision reaffirmed the Court’s holding in Brown, stating that the 
principles announced in Brown “are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms 
guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal of equal 
justice under law is thus made a living truth.”205  
Ten years later, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Justice 
Brennan would again address the issue of achieving equality of education for all 
                                                           
 200 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The first face-to-face meeting between Justice 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall is described by a Brennan law clerk, Frank I. Michelman, 
who recalled that it took place in 1961. Justice Brennan held an oral argument in his chambers 
to address an application filed by the Board of Education in New Rochelle, New York to stay 
a lower court order requiring the school board to facilitate the transfer of African-American 
school children out of segregated schools. At the time, Marshall was the lead lawyer for the 
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Education Fund. After listening attentively to the lawyer 
representing the school board, Justice Brennan asked Marshall whether there was any problem 
with the children waiting for relief. Marshall responded: “Justice Brennan, my clients have 
been waiting a long time . . . [t]hese other folks, won’t hurt them if they have to hustle a bit.” 
Justice Brennan denied the stay. For Michelman, Justice Brennan’s respect shown to both 
lawyers and his decision to consider the needs of the African-American school children was 
one of many examples where Justice Brennan “fought so ably to make the law look out for the 
dignity and ‘intrinsic worth’ of every person.” Frank I. Michelman, Tribute to Justice 
Brennan, 111 HARV. L. REV. 37, 39-41 (1997-1998). 
 201 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.  
 202 William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 23, 
25 (1991).  
 203 Transcript of Oral Argument at 90-91, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (No. 1). 
 204 The opinion in Cooper v. Aaron was first assigned to Justice Brennan, who circulated 
several draft opinions. It was eventually decided that it should be a joint opinion with 
Brennan’s draft opinion as the point of departure. Peter M. Fishbein & Dennis G. Lyons, Note 
on the Undelivered Opinions and Memoranda Included in this Volume, in Opinions of 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Aug. Special Term 1958 & Oct. Term 1958 at V (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part II, Box 6, 
Folder 1) (The case histories contained in the Brennan Papers were prepared by Justice 
Brennan and his law clerks at the end of each term to describe the evolution of certain 
decisions of the Court.).  
 205 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19-20. 
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children irrespective of their race. 206 Although Justice Brennan recognized that 
dismantling a well-entrenched system of dual education based on race was complex 
and raised multifaceted problems, he stated that, nevertheless, school boards were 
charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 
convert to a unitary system in which “racial discrimination would be eliminated root 
and branch.”207 He breathed new life into Brown by instructing school boards that 
they had an affirmative duty to eliminate racial inequality now. Chief Justice Earl 
Warren recognized the significance of the Green opinion by writing in a note to 
Justice Brennan that “[w]hen this opinion is handed down, the traffic light will have 
changed from Brown to Green.”208 Justice Brennan required the school board to 
formulate a plan that promised realistically, but promptly, to convert “to a system 
without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”209  
2. Gender Equality: Not on a Pedestal, but in a Cage 
Justice Brennan’s belief in the dignity and the equality of all persons extended to 
seeking equal rights for women. Justice Brennan believed that the “recognition of 
full equality for women—equal protection of the laws—ensures that gender has no 
bearing on claims to human dignity.”210 He sought to achieve full equality for 
women by advocating that a strict scrutiny standard be applied to the Court’s review 
of classifications based on gender.211 The authors of the Constitution, a group that 
omitted women, likely did not envision full equality of citizenship for women, who 
were not granted the right to vote until 1920.212 The Country’s history of slowly 
moving towards recognition of equal rights for women is vivid support for Justice 
Brennan’s belief that overarching principles in the Constitution can be more 
perfectly realized over time as social conditions change and the understanding of 
what constitutes human dignity evolves. 
In Frontiero v. Richardson,213 Justice Brennan sought to extend the strict scrutiny 
standard applied to racial discrimination to claims of gender discrimination, but he 
                                                           
 206 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431-32 (1968).  
 207 Id. at 437-38. Justice Marshall also recognized the difficulty of breaking apart 
segregated schools, and in a note to Justice Brennan stating that he would join Brennan’s 
opinion in Green, Justice Marshall observed that Brennan’s opinion constituted “[a] 
marvelous and careful job on a tough question.” Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (May 17, 1968) (on file with the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 174, Folder 6, Green v. 
Cnty. Sch. Bd.). 
 208 Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (May 22, 1968) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Part I, Box 174, Folder 6, Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.) 
 209 Green, 391 U.S. at 442. 
 210 Brennan, Contemporary Ratification, supra note 53, at 442.  
 211 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).  
 212 Id. at 685.  
 213 Id. at 678-79. The case was brought pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment because the plaintiff was a United States military service woman. Id. at 678. 
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was unable to obtain a majority for the heightened standard.214 Frontiero was the 
first Supreme Court case argued by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg during her many 
years of advocacy for the law’s recognition of gender equality prior to her own 
appointment to the Supreme Court.215 Justice Ginsburg stated that Justice Brennan’s 
opinion in Frontiero was “the first in a line of Brennan opinions holding that our 
living Constitution obligates government to respect women and men as persons of 
equal stature and dignity.”216 Justice Ginsburg also observed that “[n]o one on the 
Court was more suited by judicial philosophy and personal generosity to respond to 
emerging claims of diginity and equal stature than Bill Brennan.”217 
Sharon Frontiero was a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force who sought housing and 
medical benefits for her husband.218 Although these benefits would have been 
granted for a male officer seeking them for his wife, her application was denied 
because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was dependent on her for more 
than one-half of his support.219 Sharon Frontiero and her husband filed suit to obtain 
the same housing and medical benefits that a similarly-situated male service member 
would receive.220 Justice Brennan’s opinion notes that “our nation has a long history 
of sex discrimination…which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but 
in a cage.”221 As a result, the law had provided that women could not hold office, 
serve on juries, or bring suit.222 These disabilities, however, had no relation to 
women’s abilities and capabilities to perform the prohibited activities.223 Because 
classifications based on gender, like those based on race, are inherently suspect, 
                                                           
 214 When Justice Brennan circulated his first draft of Frontiero, he attached a cover letter 
stating that if there was a Court majority for recognizing sex as a suspect classification calling 
for strict scrutiny, he would have no difficulty writing such an opinion. In fact, he felt that the 
case would provide an appropriate vehicle for the court to recognize sex as a suspect 
classification. Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr. at LXXXII (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part II, Box 6, Folder 16). 
Brennan believed that he might obtain sufficient votes to support this position; therefore, he 
revised the draft to state that sex was sufficiently similar to race and national origin to justify 
its being considered a “suspect criterion.” Id. at LXXXIII. 
 215 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. 
 216 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Closing Remarks for Symposium on “Justice Brennan and the 
Living Constitution,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2217, 2219 (2007). 
 217 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Wendy Webster Williams, Court Architect of Gender Equality: 
Setting a Firm Foundation for the Equal Stature of Men and Women, in Rosenkranz & 
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 186. The authors noted that Justice Brennan emerged as the 
architect of a new tradition of respect for women’s claims to equality under the Constitution. 
Id. 
 218 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680. 
 219 Ginsburg & Williams, supra note 217, at 187. 
 220 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680. 
 221 Id. at 684-85. 
 222 Id. at 686. 
 223 Id. at 686-87. 
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Brennan advocated for an application of strict scrutiny to those laws that made a 
distinction solely upon gender.224  
Justice Brennan was unable to gain five votes for the application of strict scrutiny 
in Frontiero.225 Therefore, it was issued as a plurality opinion, striking down the law 
discriminating against Frontiero’s rights to equal benefits, but divided as to whether 
strict scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on gender.226 Justice 
Brennan was never able to achieve a Court majority for the application of strict 
scrutiny to claims of gender inequality227 and he subsequently settled in Craig v. 
Boren for an intermediate standard of review.228 Due to his pursuit of full equality 
for women, however, the standard of review applied to gender claims was 
heightened from mere rationality.229 Although Justice Brennan was disappointed that 
strict scrutiny was not applied to gender discrimination, he stated that this 
“disappointment has been far outweighed by the satisfaction that the Court has at 
least subjected gender distinctions to substantial scrutiny.”230 Justice Brennan would 
then see the Court strike down numerous discriminatory practices based on gender 
inequality under the intermediate level of review.231 
3. Economic Equality: Positive Rights? 
In Goldberg v. Kelly,232 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court that persons 
receiving public assistance have a right to due process in reviewing their eligibility 
to receive that assistance prior to it being terminated.233 The right to due process is 
even more vital where the entitlement is the individual’s basic subsistence – his right 
to basic food and shelter in order to survive.234 The Goldberg opinion expounds 
Justice Brennan’s jurisprudence affirming equality of rights for all persons. Brennan, 
however, also considered the possibility that there are individual positive rights in 
addition to “negative rights”. Rights are most often concerned with what government 
                                                           
 224 Id. at 688. 
 225 Ginsburg & Williams, supra note 217, at 187.  
 226 Id. at 187-88. 
 227 Id. at 188. 
 228 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding that a gender-based distinction in an 
Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to 
females under the age of 18 constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws for males aged 
18-20). In articulating the intermediate standard of review, Justice Brennan wrote, “To 
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.” Id. at 197.  
 229 Id. at 201. 
 230 William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
xvi, xviii (1996). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 233 Id. at 264. 
 234 Id. 
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
698 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:665 
 
cannot do – it cannot limit an individual’s speech or his right to practice his religion 
or subject him to cruel and unusual punishment. In contrast, positive rights state 
what the government must do for the individual. Justice Brennan inserted in 
Goldberg the possibility that all individuals have a right to receive basic subsistence 
from the government.235 
Although in Goldberg, the State of New York provided some elements of due 
process to individuals pending denial of their welfare benefits, including provisions 
for a seven day termination notice, opportunity to submit a written explanation, and 
review by a higher ranked official, Brennan believed that the severity of the loss 
required more.236 His opinion emphasized the importance of the government benefit 
at stake. It was a benefit that “provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, 
housing, and medical care.”237 In a later speech, Justice Brennan cited to a brief filed 
in Goldberg that told the story of the effect of denial of benefits on the individuals 
involved:  
After termination, Angela Velez and four children were evicted for non-
payment of rent and all forced to live in one small room of a relative’s 
already crowded apartment. The children had little to eat during the four 
months it took for the Department to correct its error. Esther Lett and her 
four children at once began to live on the handouts of impoverished 
neighbors, within two weeks all five required hospital treatment because 
of the inadequacy of their diet.238  
Brennan determined that because the benefit lost was that of basic subsistence, 
due process mandated the right to an oral hearing before its termination.239 The oral 
hearing would provide the individual with the opportunity to tell his story and not be 
disadvantaged by an inability to express himself in a written statement.240 The 
hearing would also provide the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses.241 The opinion, however, did not provide a right for counsel to be present, 
only the choice to retain counsel if desired.242 
In Goldberg, Justice Brennan only went as far as holding that once the 
government has made the decision to provide public assistance benefits, the benefits 
cannot be taken away without due process being afforded the recipients.243 There is 
evidence, however, that Justice Brennan would have preferred to go further to ask 
whether dignity requires the government to provide basic subsistence and to 
                                                           
 235 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265. 
 236 These procedures were instituted after the lawsuits were filed. Prior to the filing of the 
lawsuits, there were no requirements for prior notice or a hearing of any kind. Id. at 255. 
 237 Id. at 263. 
 238 Brief for Appellees, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 253 (1970) (No. 62), 1969 WL 
136924, at *27-28. 
 239 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266. 
 240 Id. at 269. 
 241 Id. at 270. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 261.  
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recognize it as a constitutional property right. Justice Brennan stated that “[p]ublic 
assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to ‘promote the general welfare, 
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.’”244 In using these 
words taken from the Constitution’s preamble, Justice Brennan made a bold 
statement that providing for the basic needs of its citizens is within the 
constitutionally considered functions of government.245 In a footnote, Brennan 
interjected the idea of welfare as a property right, stating that “[i]t may be realistic 
today to regard welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”246 He 
cited the work of Charles Reich, a Yale law professor and former clerk to Justice 
Black, who advocated for a new property right for individuals to have sufficient 
resources to live under conditions of health and decency.247 Brennan is quoted as 
stating: “I was looking for a ‘new property’ case. I knew of Charles Reich’s work—I 
remembered him from his clerkship with Justice Black—but I was interested in the 
issue before that, back in New Jersey….Goldberg v. Kelly seemed to be a good 
vehicle to present the issue.”248 
Although Justice Brennan opened the door to a consideration of whether the 
government had an interest in preserving the dignity of the poor by recognizing a 
right to basic subsistence, that position did not become the basis for his opinion. In 
order to hold Justices Harlan and White in the majority, the opinion was written 
narrowly to focus on fundamental fairness, rather than to find a property right in 
basic subsistence.249 Further, at Justice Harlan’s request, Justice Brennan deleted a 
footnote that stated, “The question concerns only procedural and not substantive due 
process. Thus, we do not consider whether a recipient has a substantive due process 
right to receive welfare[,]” or not to be compensated should it be terminated.250 
While Justice Brennan sought to introduce the concept of a substantive due process 
right to basic subsistence, Harlan wanted it deleted “lest even the mention of such a 
possibility lead to pressure for its realization.”251 
In Goldberg v. Kelly, Justice Brennan upheld for recipients of public assistance, 
the Constitution’s promise of dignity for each and every person.252 And he suggested 
                                                           
 244 Id. at 266. Justice Brennan saw in the provision of welfare benefits that met the basic 
needs of all individuals the opportunity to “help bring within the reach of the poor the same 
opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the 
community.” Id. at 265. 
 245 Id. at 265. 
 246 Id. at 262 n.8. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Tony Mauro, Fair Hearing: Legacy to the Poor, in Rosenkranz & Schwartz, supra note 
5, at 237. 
 249 Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr. at IV (on file with the Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part II, Box 6, Folder 12). 
 250 William J. Brennan, Jr., Draft Opinion, at 6, n.7 (Nov. 1969) (unpublished) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of William J. Brennan, Jr., Part I, Box 
209, Folder 3, Goldberg v. Kelly). 
 251 Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 249, at VII. 
 252 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
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that the principle of equality might require a positive constitutional right – a right to 
basic subsistence.253 The Goldberg decision marked the zenith in the consideration of 
equal rights for the poor. Justice Brennan’s vision that all individuals have an equal 
right to basic subsistence is one that is unlikely to be realized as the country has 
moved to providing less, not more, support for the poor within its borders.  
B. Liberty 
1. Liberty of Expression: No More Appropriate Response to a Burning Flag than 
Waving One’s Own 
Justice Brennan’s decisions expanded the scope of the First Amendment, so that 
individuals have the liberty to exercise their right to free expression.254 The Brennan 
decision that safeguarded the individual’s right to free expression, while at the same 
time was likely the most unsettling to the majority, was his ruling in Texas v. 
Johnson.255 In Johnson, Brennan held that Gregory Lee Johnson’s act of burning a 
flag during a political protest was expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.256 
 Johnson burned a U.S. flag during a political demonstration in 1984 that 
protested policies of the Reagan administration and certain Dallas-based 
corporations.257 Johnson unfurled the American flag in front of Dallas City Hall, 
doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire.258 Justice Brennan found this conduct to 
be overtly political and sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to 
implicate the First Amendment.259 The State of Texas argued that it had an interest in 
preventing Johnson from breaching the peace by burning the flag.260 Justice Brennan 
                                                           
 253 Id. 
 254 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 178 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) 
(“Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community is in large measure 
defined through speech; freedom of speech is therefore intrinsic to individual dignity.”); 
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. at 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“In the area of 
First Amendment freedoms, government has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive 
regulations which are adequate for the purpose.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that 
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) 
(holding that the First Amendment protects expression without regard to race, creed, religion, 
or political affiliation of the speaker or the popularity of the ideas and beliefs expressed). 
Additionally, Justice Brennan was a strong supporter of freedom of religious thought, and he 
guarded “the right of every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while 
requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between 
religion and nonreligion.” School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985). 
 255 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (showcasing an unusual alliance, in which 
Justice Antonin Scalia joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinion). 
 256 Id. at 406. 
 257 Id. at 399. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 406. 
 260 Id. at 407. 
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concluded that the evidence did not show a breach of the peace, or threat of it, only 
that several persons had been seriously offended by the flag burning.261 He wrote, “If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”262 In response to public criticism of the 
decision, the U.S. Senate voted on a Constitutional Amendment that would prohibit 
burning the U.S. flag; however, it fell short of passage by a 51 to 48 vote.263 
Congress then passed a federal flag desecration statute.264 Immediately after its 
passage, Johnson challenged the statute by burning several flags in front of the U.S. 
Capitol.265 His action prompted the Supreme Court to again uphold the right to freely 
express a political opinion by burning the flag.266 The opinion, United States v. 
Eichman, was authored by Justice Brennan.267 Although the federal statute, unlike 
the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, did not contain an explicit content-based 
limitation, Justice Brennan found that the government’s interest in prohibiting the 
burning of a flag is related to the suppression of free speech.268 He did not accept the 
government’s suggestion that the flag burning decision should be reconsidered based 
on a Congressional finding that there is a national consensus to prohibit burning of 
the U.S. flag.269 Justice Brennan noted that “[e]ven assuming such a consensus 
exists, any suggestion that the Government’s interest in suppressing speech becomes 
more weighty as popular opposition to that grows is foreign to the First 
Amendment.”270 
In Johnson and in Eichman, Justice Brennan protected the right of an individual 
to have the liberty to express himself.271 In so doing, he also upheld the principle that 
the Court can, and must, be contra-majoritarian when protecting the constitutional 
rights of an individual citizen.272  
                                                           
 261 Id. at 408. 
 262 Id. at 414. 
 263 Elaine S. Povich, Senate Rejects Flag-Burning Amendment, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 1989), 
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 264 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990). 
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37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
702 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:665 
 
2. Liberty of Personal Decisions: The Right to be Free from Government Intrusion 
into One’s Privacy 
Justice Brennan’s view of liberty recognized the right of the individual to make 
decisions regarding his person without interference from the State. He exerted 
substantial influence in the Court’s recognition of a right of privacy within the Bill 
of Rights and in the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
right to privacy developed in the context of cases that considered government 
intrusion into the individual’s right to make decisions regarding his personal, 
intimate relationships, including the decision to have a child.273 Although a Catholic, 
Brennan upheld a woman’s right to obtain an abortion until the point of viability, 
voting with the majority in Roe v. Wade.274  
On the road to Roe, Justice Douglas’ decision in Griswold v. Connecticut275 was 
heavily influenced by Justice Brennan. Griswold held that Connecticut’s birth 
control statute, which prohibited the use of contraceptives by married couples, was 
unconstitutional.276 In the first draft, Justice Douglas rested the holding on a right of 
association protected by the First Amendment.277 Justice Brennan, however, sent 
Douglas a letter recommending that the decision rest on a finding of a right of 
marital privacy.278 In the end, Douglas’ opinion held that the Connecticut law 
infringed on a fundamental right to privacy, which flowed from the specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, specifically those that protect person and home from 
government intrusion.279  
Justice Brennan would build on the concept of marital privacy recognized in 
Griswold in Eisenstadt v. Baird.280 The issue in Eisenstadt was whether a guest 
speaker at a private university who displayed contraceptives during his lecture, and 
                                                           
 273 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 274 Id. at 113 (holding that a Texas statute prohibiting abortion except when necessary to 
save the life of the mother violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it infringed on a woman’s right to privacy). 
 275 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 276 Id. at 485. 
 277 Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr. (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
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distributed one to an unmarried woman, violated a Massachusetts statute prohibiting 
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.281 Justice Brennan decided 
the case on equal protection grounds, holding that the State did not articulate a 
rational basis for discriminating between the rights of married and unmarried persons 
to obtain contraceptives.282 He noted that “whatever the rights of the individual to 
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and 
the married alike.”283 Toward the end of his opinion, however, Justice Brennan 
introduced a fundamental liberty right: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is 
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted government 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.”284 Justice Brennan’s recognition of a right to reproductive 
privacy in Eisentadt would eventually lead to the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 
which was based on a fundamental constitutional right of privacy. 
Justice Brennan’s decisions relating to the constitutionality of abortion rest on his 
belief that the individual must be allowed to make important decisions affecting his 
person free from government interference. Responding to a question concerning his 
view of the abortion issue, Justice Brennan stated that “nobody can dictate for 
everyone else what must be done with respect to the most intimate choices, private 
choices, family decisions, that individuals face.”285 Justice Brennan considered 
privacy in personal decision-making to be a species of liberty which encompasses 
“first, freedom from bodily restraint or inspection, freedom to do with one’s body as 
one likes, and freedom to care for one’s health and person; second, freedom of 
choice in the basic decisions of life, such as marriage, divorce, procreation, 
contraception, and the education and upbringing of children; and, third, autonomous 
control over the development and expression of one’s intellect and personality.”286 
Justice Brennan concluded that the decision to abort a pregnancy fit directly into 
each of the three categories of fundamental freedoms.287  
Although Justice Brennan viewed the abortion question as an issue of a woman’s 
fundamental right to make a personal, medical decision,288 he did not disregard the 
question of whether the fetus has worth or dignity.289 On that question he stated, “I 
would leave open the question when life ‘is actually present’ – whether there is some 
point in the term before birth at which the interest in the life of the fetus does 
become subordinating.”290 This appears to reflect his belief that the fetus does not 
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have human life at the time of conception, but only later acquires human life to 
which the principle of human dignity would attach.  
Justice Brennan’s role in the Court’s recognition of a constitutional right to 
privacy is perhaps the most dramatic example of his vision of human dignity 
transforming the law. From Brennan’s initial advocacy for a right to individual 
privacy to serve as the basis for Justice Douglas’ opinion in Griswold arose the right 
of all individuals to enjoy a realm of personal liberty into which the government 
cannot enter. 
VI. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
Part VI considers three contemporary issues involving individual rights from the 
perspective of a jurisprudence that recognizes equality and liberty as foundational 
principles of the Constitution. As shown in the preceding sections, Justice Brennan 
advanced both equality and liberty during his term on the Court. Questions involving 
individual rights, however, remain among the most divisive that the Court considers 
today. Part VI.A considers whether gay couples have an equal right to obtain respect 
for their relationships and the tangible benefits that are provided by government 
sanctioned marriage. Part VI.B discusses affirmative action programs, where the 
Court has eschewed an equality rationale based on well-documented inequality, in 
favor of a diversity rationale that in the long-run may be less defensible. Part VI.C 
analyzes legislative attempts to regulate campaign finance which the Court has found 
implicates liberty under the First Amendment, but has yet failed to recognize a 
government interest in the equality of persons with substantially unequal resources 
to fund political speech. James Wilson’s view that elections should be both free and 
equal is also discussed.  
A. The Right to Same-Sex Marriage 
Justice Brennan would likely uphold an individual’s right to enter into a same-
sex marriage because equality means equality of rights for every individual, 
including homosexuals, and liberty means that each individual has the freedom to 
define his intimate relationships, including to choose a marital relationship. 
Therefore, equality for homosexuals requires, as Justice Brennan advocated for 
gender, the application of a strict standard of review to any classification based on 
sexual orientation, while the individual liberty to make personal decisions cannot be 
restricted absent a compelling justification. Cases involving gay rights often focus on 
both an equality and a liberty interest.  
In 1986, Justice Brennan had the opportunity to consider a case that involved the 
individual rights of homosexuals.291 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held 
that a Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy did not violate the fundamental rights of 
homosexuals.292 Justice Brennan joined the dissents of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 
who wrote that the majority failed to consider the fundamental right of the individual 
to choose for himself how to conduct his intimate relationships,293 and Justice John 
Paul Stevens, who opined that liberty embraces the right to engage in sexual conduct 
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that others may consider offensive or immoral.294 Linking equality and liberty, 
Justice Stevens stated that the meaning of the principle that “all men are created 
equal” must surely mean that every citizen has the same interest in liberty that the 
members of the majority share.295 
In 2003, the views of the dissenters in Bowers were affirmed when the Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas overruled the holding in Bowers and recognized the right of two 
consenting adults to engage in sexual practices common to a homosexual life style 
because that behavior resided in a realm of personal liberty into which the 
government may not enter.296 In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy recognized 
the link between equality and liberty, “[e]quality of treatment and the due process 
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty 
are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests.”297 Although finding an equal protection argument tenable, Justice 
Kennedy rested his decision on a fundamental liberty interest in homosexual 
behavior, which he believed would more strongly protect homosexuals from 
discrimination.298 
Justice Brennan expressly stated his view on gay rights in 1985 when, joined by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Brennan dissented from the Court’s denial of a writ of 
certiorari in a case involving a teacher whose employment was terminated because 
she had told a colleague that she was bisexual.299 Justice Brennan identified both 
equality and liberty interests of the teacher that were impinged by the school’s 
termination of her employment due to her bisexuality.300 He wrote that 
discrimination against homosexuals or bisexuals, who constitute a significant and 
insular minority based solely on their sexual preferences, raises significant equal 
protection questions.301 He also noted that courts had found discrimination based on 
sexual preference to infringe fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to 
privacy and to freedom of expression.302 In effect, he asserted that homosexuals have 
the same rights to equality and liberty enjoyed by all other persons.  
Justice Brennan’s views on the rights of homosexuals may be considered 
progressive for 1985. Indeed, it has taken the space of an additional twenty years for 
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the equality and liberty of homosexuals to be regarded by a younger generation as a 
widely accepted social norm. In contrast, Justice Brennan’s view that the equality 
and liberty of all individuals is a foundational principle of the Constitutionnaturally 
led him to apply thatthose principle to issues involving homosexuality as early as 
1985.303 Because he consistently sought the maximum protection of equality and 
liberty for all individuals, he would uphold the right of homosexual couples to enjoy 
the same status and benefits of marriage that all similarly situated consenting adult 
couples enjoy.304  
B. Affirmative Action 
Advocacy for full equality for homosexuals flows naturally from the first 
principle that all individuals have equal rights.305 Affirmative action presents a 
harder question because by attempting to achieve equality for some individuals, the 
equal treatment of other individuals is compromised.306 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan 
supported affirmative action for racial minorities.307 After 34 years on the Supreme 
Court, his last opinion for the court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC upheld two 
minority preference policies implemented by the Federal Communications 
Commission.308 
In an earlier affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the Justices were divided on the question of affirmative action.309 Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. cast the deciding vote to invalidate the University of California 
Medical School program that gave special consideration to the admission of certain 
racial and ethnic minorities, while leaving open the possibility that some race 
conscious affirmative action programs could be upheld under a strict scrutiny 
standard.310 Justice Powell wrote that a university could have a compelling interest in 
achieving the educational benefits of a diverse student body.311 Justice Brennan, 
however, wrote a dissent that advocated for an intermediate level of scrutiny for 
affirmative action programs.312 
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A Memorandum to the Conference regarding Bakke written by Justice Brennan 
proves instructive on his reasoning for advocating lesser review of affirmative action 
programs.313 He wrote that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure 
for African Americans “real, not just abstract equality.”314 For this reason, he stated 
that it was “clear that states are free to pursue the goal of racial pluralism in their 
institutions in order to afford minorities full participation in the broader society.”315 
Justice Brennan was concerned with remedying the reality of inequality of minorities 
in institutions and in the larger society.316 He noted that it was undisputed that the 
numbers of minorities admitted to medical schools was negligible, and the number 
of black physicians was only 2.2%.317  
Justice Brennan, however, also addressed the difficult question of the affirmative 
action program’s effect on non-minorities. He acknowledged that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects non-minorities as well as minorities.318 The distinction that he 
made is that the University of California’s affirmative action program did not label 
non-minorities as inferior with a stigma, insult, or badge of inferiority.319 He did not 
believe that Alan Bakke, the non-minority applicant denied admission to medical 
school, stood before the Court in the same posture as the African-American child in 
Brown v. Board of Education.320 If the University had stereotyped Alan Bakke as 
incompetent or pinned him with a badge of inferiority because he was Caucasian, 
Justice Brennan would have applied strict scrutiny.321 Because the University’s 
affirmative action program did not demean non-minorities in an invidious manner, 
Justice Brennan viewed it as a remedial government action that could be upheld 
because it addressed the reality of a substantial inequality in medical schools and in 
the medical profession.322  
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In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, Justice Brennan upheld a congressional plan that 
benefited minorities in the award of broadcasting licenses.323 He began his opinion 
by recounting the substantial inequality that existed in the ownership of broadcast 
licenses:  
Although for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least 
one-fifth of the United States population, during this time relatively few 
members of minority groups have held broadcast licenses. In 1971, 
minorities owned only 10 of the approximately 7,500 radio stations in the 
country and none of the more than 1,000 television stations….Moreover, 
these statistics fail to reflect the fact that, as late entrants who often have 
been able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority 
broadcasters serve geographically limited markets with relatively small 
audiences.324 
He included lengthy references to the record in order to emphasize that both 
Congress and the FCC had made the appropriate findings recognizing the barriers 
encountered by minorities who sought to obtain broadcast licenses.325 Justice 
Brennan cited a Congressional finding that “the effects of past inequities stemming 
from racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation 
of minorities in the media of mass communications.”326 
Instead of focusing solely on a government interest in remedying the existing 
inequality in those who held broadcast licenses, Justice Brennan slid into a diversity 
justification, finding that the policies furthered the important governmental objective 
of achieving a greater diversity of broadcast viewpoints, which would in the end 
benefit all persons.327 He was likely constrained by the diversity holding in Bakke 
and the need to obtain four additional votes from his colleagues on this difficult 
issue.328 Justice Brennan’s failure to express and gain support for the fundamental 
nature of a government interest in achieving equality under facts showing substantial 
existing inequality in Metro Broadcasting, may have contributed to its being 
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, where the Court held that all racial 
classifications – even those that might have the effect of rectifying existing 
inequality - must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.329 
In the years since the Court decided Metro Broadcasting, the Court has tightened 
its review of affirmative action programs for racial minorities. In Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin, the Court stated that the University of Texas’ 
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affirmative action program must meet a “demanding burden of strict scrutiny.”330 At 
the same time, the unequal representation of racial minorities in many institutions 
persists. Recognizing equality as a foundational principle would sanction reasonable 
affirmative actions to achieve racial equality where inequality is substantial and 
persistent.331 Bakke and Metro Broadcasting well documented that equality for racial 
minorities did not exist in medical schools or in the ownership of broadcast 
licenses.332 To achieve equality in fact, Justice Brennan advocated a lesser standard 
of review of affirmative action programs where existing inequality was documented 
as substantial and persistent, and the program did not have the effect of stigmatizing 
any individuals.333 Justice Brennan might well ask the Court today whether 
assertions that the law should be “color-blind” reflects a “myopia which masks the 
reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior 
both by the law and by their fellow citizens.”334  
C. Campaign Finance Regulation 
Congress has enacted a myriad of campaign finance restrictions that courts have 
found, by equating money with speech, implicate the First Amendment rights of 
citizens and corporations. Justice Brennan was vigilant in upholding First 
Amendment rights as a liberty interest.335 And he believed that First Amendment 
protections extend to political speech.336 He thought, however, that corporate 
political expenditures could be regulated because corporate assets reflect the 
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers, and are not a 
reflection of their political ideas.337 Therefore, campaign finance restrictions could be 
placed on the general corporate treasury.338 
In 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission339 overruled Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a case in which Justice Brennan had joined Justice 
Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion upholding a Michigan statute prohibiting 
corporations from contributing corporate treasury funds to state office candidates.340 
The Austin Court held that there was a compelling government interest in preventing 
corruption of the political process by restricting the influence of money accumulated 
through the corporate form.341 The Court found that corruption arises where funds 
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used by a corporation for political purposes are acquired from individuals who 
contributed their money to the corporation for economic reasons and not to support 
the corporation’s political ideas.342 
The corruption rationale is not an equality rationale because the Austin opinion 
clearly states that the Michigan statute does not attempt to equalize the relative 
influence of speakers on elections. It merely requires that the expenditure reflect 
actual support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.343 The latter 
requirement is satisfied by requiring corporations to make all independent political 
expenditures from a separate fund consisting of money contributed expressly for 
political purposes.344 Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion finding that there is 
a cognizable interest in ensuring that organizations that amass great wealth in the 
economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace.345 
Brennan, however, did not invoke a rationale based on a government interest in 
equalizing the relative ability of corporations to influence elections.346 
In his concurring opinion in Citizens United, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote 
that the Austin opinion, in reality, upheld the Michigan statute’s restriction of 
corporate speech “in the name of equality,” citing scholars who opined that Austin 
adopted an equality rationale, disguised in the language of political corruption.347 
Roberts was adamant that if Austin were read to endorse a government interest in 
equalizing the ability of individuals to influence elections, that interest was expressly 
rejected by Citizens United.348 He endorsed the principle expressed in Buckley v. 
Valeo that restricting “the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”349  
Although it’s debatable whether Austin was driven by an equality rationale, 
Justice Robert’s emphatic rejection of any equality interest in political speech is 
concerning for a jurisprudence that views equality as a foundational constitutional 
principle.350 This is true even if Justice Brennan would also be challenged to 
compromise his strong support of the First Amendment by considerations of equality 
in political speech.351 On this issue, Justice Brennan may have ultimately shared the 
view of James Wilson who thought that equality, as well as liberty, in the electoral 
process is a compelling government interest. 
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In a law lecture on the Legislative Department, Wilson stated that one of the 
great principles of a democratic government is that elections are free and equal.352 
He further stated that the principle of free and equal elections should be “the first 
care, of every free state.”353 James Wilson viewed a democratic government as a 
pyramid and in order for it to rise to a dignified altitude, it must be based on a broad 
and strong foundation of the people.354 Today, where elections are heavily influenced 
by paid political advertising, the ability of all persons to participate in the democracy 
should not be compromised by foreclosing some from participating due to a lack of 
money, or allowing those with wealth to dominate the political discussion. James 
Wilson found it challenging to express “with sufficient energy” how important 
participation of every citizen is to a democracy.355 He stated that “[i]n real majesty 
an independent and unbiased elector stands superior to princes.”356  
In order to preserve the “majesty” of the voter, the Court should recognize a 
government interest in achieving equality in the relative ability of persons or groups 
to influence elections. Thus, an elector’s views would not become biased because he 
receives a substantially unequal amount of information as a result of the relative 
wealth of the speakers.357 Absolute equality is not required, but a legislature should 
be allowed to set reasonable standards in the interest of maintaining free and equal 
elections, which James Wilson believed is a primary care of government.358 For this 
reason, equality should have an equal status with liberty in preserving each person’s 
right to participate in a democracy.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The enduring vision of James Wilson expressed in the framing of the 
Constitution, which was brought forward by Justice Brennan during his tenure on the 
Supreme Court, is that the United States is composed of individuals, possessing 
innate human dignity, who each have a fundamental right to equality and liberty. 
Both men focused on the individual, whether in constructing a Constitution, or 
rendering a decision on a Constitutional issue. Although neither man saw his vision 
fully realized, their principles of equality and liberty, supported by a recognition of 
the dignity and supremacy of the individual, should remain relevant to the 
consideration of contemporary issues involving individual rights. 
 In his era, Justice Brennan was highly deferential to protecting the individual 
right to equality and liberty. The essence of individual dignity is within the 
boundaries of his opinions which sought equality of all persons without regard to 
race, gender, or sexual orientation, equal participation in the political process, liberty 
of thought and personal decision-making, and a restraint on the government as 
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against the individual. In these decisions, Justice Brennan brought to life James 
Wilson’s principle written in 1774 that “all men, are by nature, equal and free.” 
Today, the Court should strive to assure that the attainment of equality and liberty 
for each individual is considered to be a fundamental constitutional principle. And, it 
might well keep in mind Justice Brennan’s vision that the Court’s decisions should 
advance, not degrade, human dignity.359 
Justice Brennan, however, believed that the task of protecting the principle of 
human dignity did not “rest solely with nine Supreme Court justices, or even with 
the cadre of state and federal judges,” but rather that “[w]e all share the burden.”360 
He advised that continuous hard work by everyone is needed to realize the 
Constitution’s true potential: 
The vision of human dignity embodied in our Constitution throughout 
most of its interpretive history is, at least for me, deeply moving. It is 
timeless. It has inspired citizens of this country and others for two 
centuries. If we are to continue to be an example to the nations of the 
world, it will be because of our ceaseless pursuit of the constitutional 
ideal of human dignity.361 
Two centuries earlier, James Wilson had also been deeply moved by the 
Constitution stating, “I feel myself lost in the contemplation of its magnitude. By 
adopting this system, we shall probably lay a foundation for erecting temples of 
liberty in every part of the earth.”362 Foreshadowing Justice Brennan, Wilson also 
advised that “[a] good constitution is the greatest blessing, which a society can enjoy 
[therefore] it is the duty of every citizen to use his best and most unremitting 
endeavors for preserving it pure, healthful, and vigorous.”363 It is the hope of the 
Author that a new generation of lawyers and judges will be inspired by the 
Constitution’s promise of human dignity for each American. This was the vision of 
the Constitution shared by Justice Brennan and James Wilson. 
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